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The Truth in Lending Act: The Survival of a Borrower's Claim for Rescission
Francesco Ferrantelli Jr. 1

I.

Introduction

In the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008, the prevalence of mortgage lenders
issuing home equity loans to individuals who, for many possible reasons, could not repay the
loans, created a housing bubble that eventually burst. 2 One of these loans was given to Kathryn
McOmie-Gray, who closed a first deed trust loan in 2006 and was provided with various
disclosure documents to sign pursuant to the Truth In Lending Act (TILA). 3 While these
documents informed Ms. McOmie-Gray of her right to rescind the transaction, the lender failed
4

to inform her of the date on which this right to rescind would expire. This failure resulted in the
disclosure being defective under the Truth in Lending Act and entitling Ms. McOmie-Gray to
rescission. 5 Two years later, Ms. McOmie-Gray sought to exercise her rescission right by
notifying the lender of her intention to rescind. 6 The bank, however, refused to honor the
rescission and instead began a year-long negotiation regarding the loan terms. 7 After
negotiations failed, Ms. McOmie-Gray fmally filed a claim to enforce the rescission, but the
claim was dismissed by the court as untimely. 8 The court found that because the claim was filed

1

J.D. candidate, expected 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Rutgers University, New
Brunswick, New Jersey.
2
JeffSovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 19, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/ 19/opinion/a-guide-for-the-new-mortgage-forrn.htmJ?_r=O ("During the housing
bubble, countless borrowers took on mortgages they could not repay.").
3
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 2012). The facts of McOmie-Gray
as reproduced in this section are taken from the opinion of the court which, as the court was ruling upon a motion to
dismiss, accepted the plaintiff's allegations as true.
4/d.
5
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b) (2011).
6
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326.
7

/d.

8/d

over three years after the loan was created, it was barred under TILA. 9 The court precluded
relief even though Ms. McOmie-Gray exercised the right to rescind by notifying the lender a

year earlier, in accordance with the statutory and regulatory requirements. 10 In essence, the bank
was able to avoid rescission liability for its own TILA violation by delaying and negotiating with
Ms. McOmie-Gray until the statutory time limit expired.

11

The Truth In Lending Act 12 requires lenders to make a number of disclosures to
consumers before finalizing loans, in order to promote the informed use of credit and to protect
consumers against deceptive lender practices. 13 Though the Act was originally passed in 1968,
the surge in foreclosure filings following the burst of the mortgage bubble in 2008 has brought
TILA's emphasis on disclosure to the forefront of policymaking.

14

This is because a significant

cause of the mortgage crisis is considered to be the issuance of loans to borrowers who simply
did not understand the terms of the loans they were taking on. 15 Thus, disclosure requirements
are seen as an essential tool to protect consumers from abusive practices by the lending industry
and to avoid another mortgage bubble.

16

9

McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326; 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2).
11
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326.
12
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.(2006).
13
15 U.S.C. 1601(a) § (2006) ("It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices."); see also Chase Bank USA, NA v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 874-75 (2011) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 160l{a))
("Congress passed TILA to promote consumers' 'informed use of credit' by requiring 'meaningful disclosure of
credit terms'").
14
Les Christie, Foreclosures up a record 81% in 2008, CNN MONEY (Jan. 15,2009, 3:48AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/0 I /15/real_estate/millions_in_foreclosure/index.htm; Jeff Sovem, Preventing Future
Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime
Borrowers, 71 OHJO ST.L.J. 761 (2010).
15
Richard Gaudon, UNDERSTANDING THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN WHAT HAPPENED AND WHO'S TO BLAME,
http://www .moneymatters1 0 1.com/mortgage/meltdown.asp;
16
LEARN ABOUT THE BUREAU, http://www.consumerfmance.gov/the-bureau/ ("An informed consumer is the frrst
line of defense against abusive practices.").
10
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In addition to mandating disclosure requirements, TILA also provides an important
substantive right for the consumers who do not receive adequate disclosures, for loans secured
by a principal dwelling: the right to rescind the transaction.

17

As foreclosure filings increased

during the financial crisis of 2008, the number of rescission cases also increased. 18 Rescission
has become an effective tool for borrowers seeking to protect their homes against lenders who, in
the lead-up to the fmancial crisis, engaged in abusive or deceptive credit practices by failing to
provide required disclosure forms. 19 For borrowers who have taken on loans they cannot repay
due to inadequate lender disclosures, rescission is often the most powerful, and sometimes the
sole, remedy ?0
TILA provides a general three-day period for a borrower to rescind the transaction, which
is exercised by notifying the lender - when rescission is exercised within this three-day period, it
is known as "buyer's remorse" rescission. 21 If required disclosures are never provided, under 15
U.S. C.§ 1635(f) (hereinafter"§ 1635(f)") the right of rescission extends to three years after the
close of the transaction or sale of the property. 22 While it is clear that a borrower must simply
notify the lender to exercise the three-day buyer's remorse rescission, the method of exercising
rescission during the extended three-year rescission period under§ 1635(f) is less clear because
that specific subsection of the statute is silent as to the method of exercising rescission. 23 The
Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on this issue. In Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, the
15 u.s.c. § 1635.
Carter Dougherty, Banks Push Fed to Curb Borrowers' Right to Rescind Mortgages, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 16,
2010 12:01 am), available at http://www .bloomberg.com/news/20 10-12-16/fed-mortgage-recission-plan-sparksfight-between-Ienders-consumer-groups.html (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center
for Responsible Lending, estimating "thousands" of rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis).
19
Editorial, The Fed and Foreclosures, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (November 29, 2010), available at
http://www .nytimes.com/20 1O/ll/29/opinion/29mon2.html.
20
Jd. (describing rescission as "the most effective legal tool that borrowers have to fight foreclosures.").
21
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); Jacob Werrett, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 319, 337 (2009).
22
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006).
23
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). The accompanying regulation states that a borrower exercises rescission the same way under
§ 1635(t) as under§ 1635(a), but this has not been enough to allay the confusion among the circuits. See e.g.,
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012).
17

18

3

Court described§ 1635(f)'s as a strict bar on claims filed outside the three year period, but the
Court did not address the actual method of properly exercising rescission within the three-year

. d 24
peno.
While the statute,25 accompanying regulation, 26 and even the model disclosure forms

27

all

suggest that a borrower exercises rescission by notifying the lender, a dispute has developed
among the circuits concerning how exactly the consumer may satisfy the extended three year
limit for exercising rescission. Many courts have correctly concluded that a consumer satisfies
the time limit by notifying the lender of rescission in accordance with the statute and regulations.
These courts have found that, as the statutory and regulatory language indicates,§ 1635(f) only
limits a borrower's right to assert rescission, and does not contain a filing requirement. 28
However, the majority of courts, often relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Beach, have
read into the statute that a borrower must also file a lawsuit within three years to avoid
extinguishment of the rescission right. 29 Ms. McOmie-Gray's story is typical of the situation
many borrowers have found themselves in following the recent trend by the Courts of Appeals
reading a filing requirement into the statute. Instead of rescission remaining a powerful remedial
tool for borrowers to use without judicial intervention, 30 these courts have unfortunately shifted
the power of rescission into the hands of the banks that can, as they did to Ms. McOmie-Gray,
24

Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998); See discussion infra Part III.B.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), (f).
26
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011).
27
12 C.F.R. § 226, app. H-8 (2011).
28
See e.g., Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651
(Bankr. N.D. llJ. 2009); Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-cv-142, 2011 WL 4950111 10 (D. Or. Oct. 18,
2011); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2006)).
29
See e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of
America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012); Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 410 Fed.
Appx. 495 (3d Cir. Pa. 2011); Geraghty v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, No. 11-336,2011 WL 3920248 (D. Minn.
Sept. 7, 2011); Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Va. 2011); DeCosta v. U.S. Bancorp,
No. 10-0301, 2010 WL 3824224 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2010)).
30
Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17,25 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[S]ection 1635 is written with the goal of
making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the intervention of the
courts.").
25

4

stonewall until the statutory time period expires even after the borrower makes the intent to
rescind clear.
This comment addresses the unresolved circuit split over what a borrower must do to
satisfy the three year time limitation for rescission under TILA. Part II provides an overview of
TILA and the history of its passage, and details the statutory mechanism for rescission under
TILA and the accompanying regulations. Part III describes the recent circuit split regarding
TILA' s rescission requirements and provides summaries of the reasoning in the most recent
Courts of Appeals decisions. In Part IV, this Comment argues for an interpretation of §1635(f)
that will protect borrowers without overburdening lenders. This Comment concludes that §
1635(f) and its accompanying regulation must be read plainly, to only require borrowers to
notify the lender to exercise rescission, and proposes solutions to effect that outcome uniformly
throughout the circuits. Courts that have read a filing requirement into the statute have misread
the statute, misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent, and misunderstood important policy
implications.
II.

Overview of Rescission under the Truth In Lending Act

This section provides a brief background of the Truth in Lending Act and contextualizes its
passage and major subsequent amendments. After contextualizing TILA, this section then
provides of overview of the rescission remedy provided by the statute. This overview includes a
detailing of the statutory rescission procedure as well as an explanation of the actual legal effect
of rescission.
A.

Background of the Truth In Lending Act

5

In 1968 President Johnson signed the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which included
the Truth In Lending Act (TILA). 31 TILA was passed as one of the later legislative
achievements of President Johnson's Great Society agenda, and its passage is now considered to
be the "birth of modem consumer legislative activism." 32 By its own terms, the goal ofTILA is
to assure meaningful disclosures of credit terms in consumer credit transactions. 33 The purpose
of this goal is twofold: so that consumers may avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect
consumers from inaccurate and unfair practices related to credit. 34 In passing TILA, Congress
believed that a meaningful disclosure of credit terms would also promote economic stability and
competition. 35
In addition to the stated goals of TILA, the legislation has always been understood as a
remedial consumer protection statute. 36 Courts agree that TILA is a remedial statute because of
its clear purpose to protect consumers against the uninformed use of credit offered by potentially
deceptive creditors. 37 Given TILA's remedial nature, courts have also agreed that the statute
should be interpreted liberally to protect consumers. 38 TILA' s grant of the powerful right of

31

Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 146 (1968) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et
seq. (2012)); THOMPSON & RENUART, TRUTH IN LENDING, Vol. 1, § 1.2.1, at 4 (7th ed. 2010).
32
Thompson & Renuart, supra note 31 , at 5.
33
15 U.S.C. § 160l(a) (2006).
34
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The language pertaining to protecting consumers from unfair and inaccurate credit practices
was added by Congress in a 1974 amendment. P.L. 93-495 (Oct. 28, 1974), Title III,§ 302; 88 Stat. 1511.
35
15 U.S.C. § 160l(a).
36
See infra note 26 (describing the passage ofTILA as "birth of modem consumer legislative activism.")
37
See Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (lOth Cir. 1974) (quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The Act ... designed to prevent
'unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices' ... is remedial"); Begala v. PNC Bank, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th
Cir. Ohio 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute."); Smith v. No.2 Galesburg Crown
Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407,415 (7th Cir. Ill. 1980) (fmding that TILA action survives as remedial claim, and
recognizing that "courts have tended to emphasize the remedial character of the statute.").
38
See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (I 1th Cir. 2004) ("As a remedial statute, TILA must
be construed liberally in favor of the consumer."); Bega/a, 163 F .3d at 950 ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is
a remedial statute and, therefore, should be given a broad, liberal construction in favor of the consumer."); King v.
California, 784 F.2d 910,915 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) (citation omitted) ("The courts have construed TILA as a remedial
statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer."); James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. Ala.
1980) (citation omitted)(" ... the Truth-in-Lending Act, a remedial act, has usually been given a broad liberal
interpretation since it is assumed that was the intent of Congress").

6

rescission to borrowers for certain loans that violate TILA's requirements is symbolic of the
consumer-oriented intent of Congress that has also been recognized by the courts. 39
TILA promotes its goals primarily by mandating disclosure requirements for various
types of credit transactions. TILA contains disclosure requirements for open-end credit loans40
(defmed as "plan[s] under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions,
which prescribes the terms of such transactions, and which provides for a finance charge which
may be computed from time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance"41 ) as well as closed-end
credit loans, 42 which are defined as credit loans that are not open-end, such as mortgages. 43 For
closed-end transactions such as mortgages, TILA requires disclosure of the identity of the
creditor, the amount financed, the finance charge, APR, and more. 44 To give force to these
disclosure requirements, TILA provides consumers with a powerful substantive right: the right to
rescind certain loan transactions, which arises when a lender fails to provide the mandated
disclosures. 45 This right applies to any consumer credit transaction secured by a principal
dwelling, 46 except for residential mortgage transactions. 47
TILA has faced numerous amendments and revisions in its over thirty-year history. 48
The frrst amendment affecting rescission rights occurred in 1974. 49 While the extended
39

15 U.S.C § 1635 (2006); See THOMAS & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.1, at 5; see infra notes 37, 38.
15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2006).
41
15 U.S.C. § 1602(j) (2006).
42
15 u.s.c. § 1638 (2006).
43
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(10) (2011); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) ("[t]he transaction here
would qualify .as closed-end, because it does not fit any of the defmitions of an open-end credit transaction").
44
15 u.s.c. § 1638.
45
15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006).
46
15 U.S.C. § 1635. The statute does not defme "principal dwelling." The official staff interpretations published by
the Federal Reserve Board contain some guidance, however. 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I at 226.23(a)(l )(1997) ("A
consumer can only have one principal dwelling at a time ... A vacation or other second home would not be a
principal dwelling.").
47
12 C.F.R. 226.23(f)(l) (2011). A "residential mortgage transaction" is defmed as a "transaction in which a
mortgage ... is created or retained against the consumer's dwelling to fmance the acquisition or initial
construction of such dwelling." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2006). Thus, general1y, the rescission right applies to
refmancing loans and home improvement loans with respect to a borrower's principal dwelling.
48
For an overview of all of the amendments to TILA, see THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.1.
40

7

rescission right was initially open-ended once triggered, Congress, in response to complaints
from the lending industry, amended the statute to add a three year time limit for rescission-§
1635(f). 50 Another amendment affecting rescission occurred in 1980, when Congress tweaked
the statute to limit rescission rights to loans secured by a "principal dwelling," as opposed to a
"residence. " 51 Despite these minor limitations on the rescission right, TILA remained a
significant source of borrower's rights after the early amendments.

52

During the early 1990s, TILA' s rescission requirement became an important consumer
defense against the possibility of foreclosure. 53 Home equity borrowing had increased and had
·become a primary credit tool. 54 As a result of the mass securitization of homes, the homes of
many borrowers became exposed to fmancial risk and rescission became a vital tool for
consumer protection. 55 In addition, the credit industry still had complaints concerning the law,
especially after an Eleventh Circuit, Rodash v. AlB Mortgage Co., decision interpreted TILA's
disclosure requirements in a way that exposed many existing mortgages to rescission. 56
Subsequently, Congress passed The Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995 (the 1995

49

Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title IV,§§ 404,405,412,88 Stat. 1517, 1519 (1974).
Jamerson v. Miles, 421 F. Supp. 107, 110, (N.D. Tex. 1976) ("The open-ended nature of the rescission right,
however, ended on October 28, 1974, when Congress amended section 1635 to include a new subsection (f), which
imposed a three-year limitation on the right to rescind.").
51
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612,94 Stat. 132 (1980).
52
THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.2 at 7.
53
Id § 1.2.5 at 8.
54
!d. (citing NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION, PREEMPTION, AND INDUSTRY
ABUSES§ 2.4 (4th ed. 2009 and Supp.) (discussing the deregulation of the residential mortgage market).
55
THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § I .2.5 at 8. A number of questionable creditor practices also contributed
to a proliferation of TILA violations. For instance, some creditors "unbundled" the costs of originating loans, and
instead passed the costs onto consumers piece-by-piece without disclosing these costs at the initial transaction. Jd
For a discussion of other creditor practices that result in widespread TILA violations and created an impetus behind
the I 995 amendments, see id.
56
Rodash v. Am Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. Fla. 1994). In Rodash, the court ruled that "intangible
taxes" were "fmance charges" under TILA -a categorization that made these charges a disclosure requirement.
This decision resulted in some borrowers rushing to refmance their loans into rescindable mortgage transactions
because most creditors did not quickly update their disclosure terms to reflect the Rodash decision. THOMPSON &
RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 8-9.
50

8

Amendments). 57 The 1995 Amendments tweaked the disclosure requirements and provided
retroactive immunity for certain loans exposed to rescission by the Rodash decision. 58
Importantly for the right to rescind, the 1995 Amendments created special rules for rescission
claims raised as a defense in foreclosure. 59 In particular, some of the retroactive immunity
granted by the law did not apply to these rescission claims, and the tolerance level for disclosure

°

violations was made much lower for these claims. 6 Congress's decision to provide special
treatment to rescission claims raised in foreclosure and to retain rescission as a powerful
consumer remedy ensured the importance of rescission as a remedy for borrowers who did not
receive proper disclosure forms. 61
Subsequent amendments related primarily to the disclosure requirements and had no
effect on the rescission remedy. 62 Nonetheless, the trend of these amendments was in line with
the purpose of TILA - to protect consumers. For instance, in an otherwise pro-creditor63
bankruptcy amendment package in 2005, some disclosure requirements were heightened for
certain transactions. 64

57

Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 (1995); THOMPSON & RENUART,
supra note 31 , § 1.2.5 at 8.
58
Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, §§ 2, 4.
59 ld. § 8.
60
I d. The 1995 Amendments also limited rescission in foreclosure to only certain disclosure violations.
61
THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("(T]he retention of the rescission remedy and the relatively
low tolerance for defensive claims re-emphasized the particular important of TILA in providing a remedy for
borrowers in foreclosure.").
62
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301-1309, 119 Stat
23 (2005); Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008); Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1638(b)(2)); The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat.1632 (2009).
63
See Timothy Egan, Newly Bankrupt Raking in Piles of Credit Offers, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 1 1, 2005),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/ll/national/11credit.html?_r=O.
64
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301-1309, 119 Stat
23 (2005).

9

Though the 1995 Amendments were considered in some aspects to be creditor-friendly, 65
the 2008 fmancial crisis provided the impetus for further amendments to TILA intended to
protect consumers. 66 The crisis was fueled by a mortgage industry collapse caused in large part
by the mass issuance of loans to borrowers who could not afford them. 67 TILA' s rescission right
became increasingly important as foreclosure filings increased. 68 Perhaps in response to
criticism that TILA's inadequate disclosure requirements were a cause of the mortgage crisis, 69

°

Congress once again acted to protect consumers by amending TILA. 7 For instance, Congress
provided further protection to borrowers by requiring early disclosures of credit terms for loans
secured by a principal dwelling. 71 Congress also provided a safe-harbor for loan servicers from
TILA violations to encourage loan modifications in lieu of foreclosure. 72 And most importantly,
an amendment in 201 0 created and transferred rule-making authority for implementing TILA to
an agency with a decidedly more consumer-oriented approach. 73 Originally, rulemaking

65

THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("[T]he 1995 amendments provided some additional leeway
to creditors in making certain TIL disclosures."). The credit-friendly nature of the 1995 amendments should not be
overstated, however, considering that rescission remained a powerfuJ remedy and rescission cJaims raised in
foreclosure, though limited to only certain disclosure violations, were provided with lower tolerance for disclosure
violations compared to other claims. See infra note 61.
66
See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat 1734
(2009); Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 110-315, § 1101, 122 Stat 3078 (2008); Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1638(b)(2)); Prevent Mortgage Foreclosure and Enhance Mortgage Credit Availability, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 201,
123 Stat 1632 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
1100A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
67
See Sovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2.
68
Dougherty, supra note 18 (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible
Lending, estimating "thousands" of rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis).
69
Sovem, supra note 14.
70
See infra note 66.
71
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 2502(a), 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2)).
72
Prevent Mortgage Foreclosure and Enhance Mortgage Credit Availability, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 201, 123 Stat
1632 (2009).
73
Dougherty, supra note 18 ("Since the fmancial crisis began, the Fed has come under criticism for having failed to
meet its existing legal mandate to protect consumers from deceptive mortgages and other financial products. That
track record was one reason behind Congress's push to create an independent consumer agency.").

10

authority to implement TILA had been granted to the Federal Reserve Board.

74

However, in

201 0 a Congress interested in expanding consumer protection transferred rulemaking authority to
the newly-created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 75 In an early exercise of rulemaking authority, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has proposed new disclosure guidelines to provide
borrowers with simplified information regarding credit terms. 76
B.

Rescission under TILA
Since its inception, TILA has included a substantive right of rescission for the borrowers

whose loans are secured by principal dwellings. 77 This right only applies to loans that are not
residential mortgage transactions, 78 which are secured loans used to finance the acquisition of
property or the initial construction of property. 79 Thus, the rescission right applies most often to
loans that are refinancing arrangements on principal dwellings, and loans that are given to
finance remodeling efforts on principal dwellings. This section provides a brief overview of this
rescission process and the legal effect of rescission.
1.

The Rescission Process

For the transactions to which the rescission remedy is available, the law requires lenders,
as an additional disclosure requirement, to disclosure the existence of a security agreement, the
borrower's general right to rescind, the method of rescission with a form provided, the effect of

74

Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 148 (1968).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 11OOA, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006) (current statute granting TILA rulemaking authority to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.11, at 11.
76
See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU PROPOSES "KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE" MORTGAGE FORMS,
http://www.consumerfmance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-fmancial-protection-bureau-proposes-know-before-youowe-mortgage-forms/; see also Sovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2.
77
15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006). See infra note 46 for information regarding the defmition of"principa1 dwe11ing."
78
See infra note 4 7.
79
15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (2006).
75

11

rescission, and the date on which rescission expires. 80 To help implement TILA, Congress
originally granted rulemaking authority to the Federal Reserve Board, which promulgated

influential regulations known as "Regulation Z. " 81 The regulations provide a sample disclosure
form that serves as a guideline to lenders. 82
Figure 1: Sample Notice of Right to Cancel, Regulation Z 83
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL
Your Right to Cancel
You are entering into a transaction that will result in a [mortgage/lien/security interest] [on/in]
your home. You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this transaction, without cost, within
three business days from whichever of the following events occurs last:
(1) the date of the transaction, which is _ _ _ _; or
(2) the date you received your Truth in Lending disclosures; or
(3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel.
If you cancel the transaction, the [mortgage/lien/security interest] is also cancelled. Within 20
calendar days after we receive your notice, we must take the steps necessary to reflect the fact that
the [mortgage/lien/security interest] [on/in] your home has been cancelled, and we must return to
you any money or property you have given to us or to anyone else in connection with this
transaction.
You may keep any money or property we have given you until we have done the things mentioned
above, but you must then offer to return the money or property. If it is impractical or unfair for
you to return the property, you must offer its reasonable value. You may offer to return the
property at your home or at the location of the property. Money must be returned to the address
below. If we do not take possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days of your
offer, you may keep it without further obligation.
How to Cancel

Ifyou decide to cancel this transaction, you may do so by notifying us in writing, at
80

15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006); 12 § C.F.R. 226.23(b)(l) (2011).
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, Title I, Ch 1, § 105,82 Stat. 148 (May 29, 1968); 12 C.F.R. §§
226 et seq. Congress has since transferred rulemaking authority to the more consumer-oriented Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. infra note 75.
82
See infra Figure 1.
83
12 C.F.R. § 226, app. H-8 (2011) (emphasis added).
81
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(creditor's name and business address).
You may use any written statement that is signed and dated by you and states your intention to
cancel, or you may use this notice by dating and signing below. Keep one copy of this notice
because it contains important infonnation about your rights.
If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice no later than midnight of (date) (or
midnight of the third business day following the latest of the three events listed above). If you
send or deJiver your written notice to cancel some other way, it must be delivered to the above
address no later than that time.
I WISH TO CANCEL
Consumer's Signature

Date

Delivery of the rescission notice, along with other disclosure forms, is only the first step in the
TILA rescission process. The law provides a three day window for the borrower to rescind the
transaction84 - the so-called "buyer's remorse" rescission provision. 85 This three day window
begins at either the close of the transaction or delivery of the required disclosure forms,
whichever comes later. 86 In the event that the required disclosure forms are never provided, the
borrower's window to exercise the right to rescind is extended for three years under§ 1635(±). 87
This extension begins at either the close of the transaction or the sale of the property, whichever
occurs first. 88
To exercise rescission during the three-day buyer's remorse window, the statute is clear
that the borrower may rescind the transaction by "notifying the creditor, in accordance with
regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so." 89 The regulation requires borrowers to

84

15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
Jacob Werrett, Achieving Meaningful Mortgage Reform, 42 CONN. L. REv. 319, 337 (2009).
86
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
87
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
88
I d. The sample notice of right to rescind does not specifically include information regarding this extended right to
rescind. See Figure 1.
89
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
85
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"notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written
communication. " 90 Thus, courts agree that notification is sufficient to exercise rescission under
the buyer's remorse provision. 91 Under§ 1635(f)'s three-year time extension, in contrast, the
manner in which a borrower must exercise the right to rescind is not specifically described. 92
Nor does§ 1635(f) contain a requirement that the borrower file a lawsuit to exercise the right. 93
Moreover, Regulation Z's admonishment that rescission is exercised by notifying the creditor of
rescission does not specify that it refers to buyer's remorse rescission, § 1635(f) rescission, or
both. 94 Courts disagree over whether a borrower must simply notify a lender to satisfy §
1635(f)'s time limitation, or whether a borrower must also file a lawsuit within the three year
period to preserve the rescission right. 95
The actual rescission process, once properly exercised by a borrower, is governed by §
163 5(b) and its implementing regulation. 96 After the borrower exercises the right to rescind, the
lender is obligated to, within twenty days, return any money or property that was provided by the
borrower back to the borrower. 97 Thus, the onus is on the lender to cancel the security interest.
Only then is the borrower required to tender the money given in return for the security interest

90

12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011).
See e.g., Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer Disc. Co., 606 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("Section 1635(a)
only requires the obligor to notify the creditor of his or her intention to rescind in accordance with regulations
promulgated by the Board . . . If Congress had wished either to place an additional burden on the obligor or to grant
the creditor additional time to respond to this type of rescission notice, it would have done so.").
92
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006) (silent on method of rescission) with 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (rescission
exercised by "notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so.").
93 /d.
94
Id. For an argument that this regulation refers to exercising rescission under both the buyer's remorse provision
and§ 1635(f), see infra Part IV.C.
95
See discussion infra III.C.
96
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006), 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011). The 1995 TILA amendments created special rules
regarding rescission raised as a shield against foreclosure. THOMPSON & R.ENUART, supra note 31 § 1.2.5 at 9; see
also infra Part ll.A. These rules limit rescission after foreclosure to one of two disclosure failures: (1) when the
mortgage broker fee is not included in the fmance charge disclosure, and (2) when the required rescission rights
disclosure forms are not provided. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23{h) (2011).
97
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (Lender must within twenty days "return to the obligor any money or property given as
earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and ... take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the
termination of any security interest created under the transaction.").
91
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or, if preferable and reasonable, the property to the lender, in return for cancellation of the
security interest. 98 The aim of this process is to return each party - the borrower and lender - to
the status quo before the transaction was consummated.

99

While Regulation Z states that this procedure may be modified by court order,

100

there is

no suggestion that a court must oversee this process, which has been characterized as a private
non-judicial procedure. 101 Indeed, this process has been described as enhancing common law
rescission to provide more protection for consumers in the specific context of mortgages. 102
Practically speaking, rescission is often used by borrowers facing foreclosure to force a
loan modification involving an entirely new lender. 103 The original lender is required to return
interest and fees to the consumer, and a second lender pays the principal due to the first lender
while negotiating a new loan with the borrower. 104 The end result is protecting borrowers from
being foreclosed upon on the basis of illegal loans, returning the lender to the status quo by

98

12 C.F.R § 226.23(d). However, some courts have used their equitable power over the TILA rescission process
to require a showing that the borrower has the ability to tender before granting rescission. See generally, Lea
Krivinskas Shepard, It's All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers' Right ofRescission Under the Truth In
Lending Act, 89 N.C.L. REv. 171 (2010).
99
See McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418,421 (1st Cir. Mass. 2007) ("Rescission
essentially restores the status quo ante; the creditor terminates its security interest and returns any monies paid by
the debtor in exchange for the latter's return of all disbursed funds or property interests."); Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d
114, 119, 1974 (5th Cir. Tex. 1974) ("[S]ection 1635(b) is clearly designed to restore the parties as much as possible
to the status quo ante."); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. Haw. 2003) (quoting Quenzer v.
Advanta Mortgage Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884, 888 (D. Kan. 2003)) ("within the meaning of[TILA], 'rescission' does
not mean an annulment that is defmitively accomplished by unilateral pronouncement, but rather a remedy that
restores the status quo ante."); Bynum v. Equitable Mortg. Group, No. 99 CV 2266-SBC-JMF, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6363, at *41 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2005) ("[§ 1635(b)] is clearly designed to restore the parties as much as
possible to the status quo ante.").
100
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4).
101
See Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 412 F.3d 1517,25 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) ("[S]ection 1635
is written with the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor
without the intervention ofthe courts.").
102
See Shepard, supra note 98, at 188 ("TILA's rescission provisions shift significant leverage to consumers by
enhancing the protections provided to consumers under common law causes of action and remedies.").
103
Dougherty, supra note 18.
104
I d. ("Borrowers usuaJly exercise the right of rescission during a foreclosure or other legal proceedings,
effectively forcing a Joan modification. The borrower seeks a new lender, the original Jender returns interest and
fees, and the principal is repaid by the second lender.").
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having the principal repaid, and allowing the borrower to live in the home and make payments
under a loan that complies with the law.
In terms of damages, the law allows individuals to recover money damages for various
TILA violations. 105 For instance, the lender can be subject to a cause of action seeking damages
for failing to honor rescission. 106 TILA allows this by creating a right to costs and attorneys'
fees for borrowers who are forced to file suit to have rescission properly effected. 107 The cause
of action seeking damages for a TILA violation, such as failing to honor the rescission properly
demanded by the borrower, must be brought within one year of the violation occurring. 108
2.

Effecting Rescission

There is currently a dispute among the courts as to whether exercising the right to rescind
in accordance with§ 1635(b) and the accompanying regulations effectively voids the transaction,
or if it merely advances a claim for rescission that must be confirmed by a court. 109
This issue is important to note because some courts confuse the issue of effecting
rescission with the issue of exercising the rescission right. 110 This Comment is only concerned
with the latter issue. The language of the statute and Regulation Z suggest that the loan (and
security interest) is automatically voided as a matter of law when the borrower exercises the
rescission right, 111 and some courts have adopted this view. In affirming the borrower's right to

105

15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006).
101 Id.
108
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006).
109
Compare Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat'] Trust Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 695 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (borrower entitled to
rescission when lender failed to respond to rescission notice) and 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) ("(W]hen an obligor exercises
his right to rescind under[§ 1635(a)], he is not liable for any fmance or other charge, and any security interest given
by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission.") with
Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 54-55 (1st Cir. R.I. 2002) ("[T]he security interest becomes
void when the obligor exercises a right to rescind that is available in the particular case, either because the creditor
acknowledges that the right of rescission is available, or because the appropriate decision maker bas so
determined.").
110
See e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012).
111
See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2006), 12 C.F.R § 226.23(d)(1) (2011); see infra note 109.
106
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rescind, for instance, the court in Lippner v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 112 allowed rescission
as a remedy even after a judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered, because the borrower had
demanded rescission earlier in a notice that was ignored by the lender. Under this approach, the
lender can refuse to honor the rescission and seek a declaratory judgment. Other courts have
found that a borrower who exercises rescission rights "has merely asserted a claim seeking
rescission." 113 Under this view, rescission is not recognized by the law until either the lender
honors it or it is confirmed by a court.
The issue of effecting rescission is not the subject of this Comment and is mentioned in
passing only as an issue that frequently appears in the cases. Moreover, the issue of when
rescission is effected is sometimes confused with satisfying the temporal limitation under §
1635(f), which is the subject of this Comment. 114 For the purposes of exercising rescission with
three years to satisfy§ 1635(f), the moment at which rescission is recognized by the law is
irrelevant. Indeed, it is consistent for a court to hold that an exercise of rescission did not
automatically void the transaction, but that it was timely under§ 1635(f). 115
III.

1976 to Beach: Early Case Law Developments Regarding Exercising Rescission
Rights Under 1635

Since § 1635(f) was enacted in 1976, two distinct issues of statutory interpretation arose
in the courts. Some cases dealt with the issue of exercising rescission rights (hereinafter "the
Exercising Rights cases") and other cases dealt with the nature of the time limitation under

112

Lippner, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 597 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (E.D. Va. 2009); see also, e.g., In re Merriman, 329
B.R. 710, 719 (D. Kan. 2005) ("The plain language of the statute indicates that exercising the right to rescind is a
discrete event; and rescission is a separate discrete event."); Yamamoto v. Bank ofNew York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th
Cir. 2003); American Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815 (4th Cir. 2007).
4
JJ See e.g., Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1187;
115
Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012) ("We must not conflate the issue of
whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been
completed and the contract voided. The former is the concern of§ 1635(t) and Regulation Z, and a borrower
exercises her right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to her creditor her intention to rescind.").
113
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§ 1635(£): whether it is a strict three year limitation or flexible ("Limitation cases"). Both lines of
cases will be summarized in this section. Then, this section summarizes the Supreme Court case
that is the definitive Limitation case- Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Banl!

16

-

which has been relied on

improperly by many courts applying its holding to the Exercising Rights issue.
A.

Pre-Beach Cases Interpreting§ 1635(f)
1.

The Exercising Rights Cases

There was never agreement among the courts as to the proper method of exercising
rescission during the three year time window. Some of the ftrst courts to rule on this issue were
in conflict. For example, in Clemmer v. Liberty Financial Planning, Inc., 117 the court found that
the borrower exercised rescission by sending a rescission letter to the lender. However, in

Jamerson v. Miles, 118 the court dismissed an action because the plaintiff failed to ftle an action
seeking enforcement of rescission with three years. 119 The proper method of exercising
rescission has been a subject of dispute from the inception of§ 1635(f).
In later cases, many courts seemed to coalesce around the argument that exercising
rescission is accomplished for the purposes of§ 1635(f) by simply notifying the lender. For
example, in In re Porter, 120 the court found that the borrower was entitled to rescission when she
notified lender of rescission within three years of loan consummation. 121 Similarly, the court in

Rowland v. Novus Fin. Corp. 122 allowed a TILA claim when the borrower asserted the right to

523 u.s. 410 (1998).
467 F. Supp. 272 (W.D.N.C. 1979). This case applied TILA as it existed before the§ 1635(t) time limitation was
enacted.
118
421 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
119
Jd at 111.
120
961 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. Pa. 1992).
121
/d. at 1078 (emphasis added) ("[The bank]'s failure extended [the borrower's] time to request rescission to three
years from the date of the 1987 loan ... Therefore her 1990 letter request to rescind was timely.").
122
949 F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (D. Haw. 1996).
116

117
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rescind within three years. 123 And in Rowland v. Magna Millikin Bank, NA.,

124

the court found

that the borrowers exercised rescission and effected rescission by letter to the lender within three
years. Finally, the court in Stone v. Mehlberg, 125 found that the borrowers exercised rescission
by notifying the lender by letter. 126
Of course, some courts still held to the view that a borrower must file an action to satisfy
§ 1635(£). For instance, the court in Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Disc. Co. 127 noted in dicta that a
borrower has three years after consummation of a loan "within which to bring an action for
rescission. " 128 In other cases, the issue did not arise because a lawsuit seeking rescission was
filed within the three year window anyway or because the court declined to rule on the issue. 129
In any event, these cases shows that there was confusion among the courts as to the method of
exercising rescission under§ 1635(£) even before the Supreme Court decision in Beach. The
Beach court did not resolve the issue contemplated by these cases, which has continued the
confusion among the courts and has caused a recent Circuit split as rescission cases dramatically
increased during the fmancial crisis of the 2000s. 130
2.

The Limitation Cases

123

Id at 1455 ("Plaintiff asserted his right to rescind [within three years of consummation of the loan]. This notice
of rescission was timely if, as Plaintiff alleges, Defendant did not provide the requisite notice of right to rescind or
the material disclosures.").
124
812 F. Supp. 875 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
125
728 F. Supp. 1341 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
126
Id at 1347 (borrowers "properly exercised their right by informing the [lenders] of their intent to rescind by
letter."). See also, e.g., McCoy v. Harriman Utility Bd., 790 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1986) (holding that rescission
claim survives because "Plaintiff mailed her notice of rescission ... within three years of all relevant dates").
127
898 F.2d 896, 903 (3d Cir. 1990).
128/d
129

See e.g., Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & Boland, 531 F. Supp. 717, 721-722 (D. Minn. 1982); Hefferman v.
Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 383-384 (9th Cir. Cal. 1989) (dec1ining to decide whether 1635(f) only requires notice).
130
See discussion infra Parts III.B, IILC.
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Another line of cases arose parallel to the Exercising Rights cases, dealing with the issue
of the nature of§ 1635(f)'s three year time window. The split in these cases was resolved by the
1998 Supreme Court decision in Beach.

131

Some of the Limitation cases found that even outside the three year window, rescission
could be raised as a defense to foreclosure. For example, in Dawe v. Merchants Mortg. & Trust

Corp., the borrower attempted to demand rescission two years after the lender filed suit seeking
judgment on the loan.

132

The court allowed the rescission claim to survive§ 1635(f)'s time

limit, even though it was raised outside of the three year time window. 133 The court found that
rescission raised as a defense in the nature of recoupment is not barred by § 163 5(f). 134 A
number of other courts throughout the country reached a similar conclusion, characterizing
rescission claims raised defensively in recoupment actions as exceptions to§ 1635(£). 135 These
courts reasoned that an alternative reading of the statute would "would allow a creditor to wait
three years to file its suit and thereby defeat the purpose of the Act." 136
Concurrently, other courts were holding that the rescission period is strict and that no
claims asserted outside the three year period could survive. Some courts explicitly rejected a
tolling theory for§ 1635(£), fmding it to be a strict statute that can not be tolled. 137 Other courts
rejected the exception for rescission raised as a defense to recoupment, holding that a borrower
"cannot revive a time-barred claim by characterizing his suit as a defense to an illegal claim
131

See discussion infra Part lli.B ..
683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984).
133
!d. at 801.
134
Id ("[P]etitioners' demand for rescission constitutes a defense in the nature of recoupment and is not barred by
the limitations period set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).").
135
See e.g., In re Barsky, 210 B.R. 683, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) ("holding that "rescission can be asserted
defensively even if it is effected after the§ 1635(f) three-year period has run."); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill. App.
3d 553, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1995) ("(B]ecause defendant raised her claim for rescission of the mortgage in
response to plaintiff's foreclosure action, she was not barred by the three-year limitation contained in section 1635(f)
of the Act.").
136 Id
132

137

E.g., 1n re Shaw, I 78 B.R. 380, 386 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (tolling the statutory rescission period is improper
because 1635(f) is a strict time limitation on asserting claims).
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under the recoupment theory provided by the statute." 138 These courts characterized§ 1635(f) as
a strict repose period for the "right of rescission," but did not rule on whether notification of
rescission within the repose period satisfies the statute.

139

The split in the Limitation cases was resolved when the Supreme Court decided Beach. 140
There, the Court endorsed the strict view of§ 1635(f)'s three year period but, just as the other
courts in the Limitation line of cases, was silent as to the proper method of exercising
•

•

reSCISSIOn.
B.

141

The Supreme Court's Decision in Beach v. Ocwen Fed Bank
The major Supreme Court decision concerning § 1635(f) is Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank. 142

Beach was decided in 1998, after the 1995 TILA amendments. Beach continues to be the

primary point of reference for courts interpreting§ 1635(±). 143
In Beach, the defendant borrowers had taken out a loan secured by their home in 1986,
and stopped making payments in 1991. 144 The bank initiated foreclosure proceedings in 1992,
and the defendants raised rescission as a defense to that action, alleging various disclosure
violations. 145 This rescission defense was raised well outside the three year time limitation
imposed by§ 1635(f). 146 The borrowers argued that§ 1635(f) only operated as a limitation on
borrowers bringing rescission on their own, and did not bar defenses of rescission raised outside
138

Moor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. Miss. 1986) (internal quotation removed); Great W. Bank
v. Shoemaker, 695 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997) (citation omitted) ("[S]ection 1635 'mirrors a
statute of repose' and 'unambiguously expresses Congress's intent to extinguish the statutory right of rescission
three years after the transaction's closing.'").
139
Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996) affd 523 U.S. 410 (1998)
(holding "that the statutory right of rescission under TILA expires three years after the closing of the transaction and
may not be revived as a defense in recoupment in an action to collect the debt upon the buyer's default," but not
ruling on how a borrower may properly assert rescission.").
140
See discussion infra Part III.B.
141/d
142

523 u.s. 410 (1998).
See discussion infra Part ill. C.
144
Beach, 523 U.S. at413.
143

145

/d.

146

ld.
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the three year window. 147 The borrowers argued this because, at the time, there was a circuit
split concerning whether rescission raised as a defense is an exception to§ 1635(f)'s time
limitation. 148 As phrased by the court, the issue presented was "whether a borrower may assert
this right to rescind as an affirmative defense in a collection action brought by the lender more
than three years after the consummation of the transaction."

149

In other words, the borrowers did

not argue that anything they satisfied the three year time limit imposed by§ 1635(f)- instead,
they argued that their defense should survive even though it was raised outside of the three year
period. 150
The Court in Beach began its analysis by noting that§ 1635(f) "says nothing in terms of
bringing an action" and instead provides a time period for expiration of the right ofrescission. 151
The court found that§ 1635(f) governs the life of the underlying right granted by the statute, and
not of a lawsuit's commencement. 152 The Court then compared§ 1635(f)'s three year time
limitation to the one year statute of limitations for actions arising out of TILA violations ("§
1640(e)"). 153 The Court noted that§ 1640(e) contains an exception for claims ofTILA
violations raised as a defense in recoupment or set-off actions. 154 According to § 1640(e), claims
for recoupment damages can be brought as a defense to any action with no statutory time
limitation. 155 The Court found that this amounted to Congressional intent for separate treatment
to apply to § 1635(f)'s time limitation, because§ 1635(f) contains no similar exception. 156 The

147

ld at415 .
Beach, 523 U.S. at 415; see discussion infra Part TII.A.2.
149
Beach, 523 U.S. at 411-412.
150
See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012) ("The Beach Court did not
address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right.").
151
Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added).
148

152/d
153

Jd at 418; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006).

154

Beach, 523 U.S. at 418.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
156
Beach, 523 U.S. at 418.

155
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Court reasoned that allowing rescission claims to be raised perpetually as defenses in
recoupment actions pursuant to § 1640(e) would "cloud the title" of mortgages during
foreclosure.

157

The Court concluded that § 1635(f)'s three year time extension must be an

absolute bar on rescission, raised defensively or otherwise, if asserted outside the three year
period.

158

Thus, Beach stands for the proposition that § 163 5(f) is a strict three year limitation, and
that even a defense of rescission raised after the three year period is precluded by the statute. 159
Subsequent cases have interpreted this decision as holding§ 1635(f) to be a statute of repose,
even though the Supreme Court never used that particular phrase in the Beach opinion.

160

The

Court left open the exact method of exercising the rescission right within the three year statutory
period - whether notice to the lender is sufficient, or if the filing of a lawsuit is an additional
requirement. 161 Instead, the Beach court affirmatively rejected any claims raised outside the
three year period. Thus, the Supreme Court addressed the nature of§ 1635(f)'s time limitation
contemplated by the Limitation cases 162 but did not resolve the confusion among the courts

. he Exerctstng
. . Ri ghts cases. 163
expressed tnt
C.

The Post-Beach Circuit Split Concerning the Method of Exercising the Right to Rescind

ld
Id
159 Id.
160
See e.g., Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1181 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012) (quoting Beach, 523 U.S.
at 417) ("[T]he [Beach] Court ... held that [1635(t)] 'govem[s] the life of the underlying right [of rescission],' and
is therefore not a statute of limitations, but one of repose."); Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 638 (7th
Cir. 2008); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Manzo, 960 N.E.2d 1238, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 201 1) ("The Supreme
Court ... found that the three-year deadline in section 1635(f) was not a statute of limitations but a statute of
repose."); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012).
Courts have also found that, as with all statutes of repose, equitable tolling is impossible. See e.g., Jones v. Saxon
Mortg., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. Va. 1998) (citation omitted) ("Because§ 1635(f) is a statute of repose, the time
period stated therein is typically not tolled for any reason.").
161
See Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012) ("The Beach Court did not
address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right.").
162
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
163
See discussion infra Ili.A.l
157
158
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As noted above, 164 the Supreme Court in Beach ruled defmitively that§ 1635(f) is a strict
three year time limitation on the federal right to rescind- raised "defensively or otherwise." 165
However, the Court did not touch upon the question of how a borrower must exercise rescission
within the three year time limit - instead, the Court was ruling on whether certain claims raised
outside the three year period could survive, and held that they could not. 166 Thus, after Beach,
the split among the lower courts concerning what a borrower must do to properly exercise
rescission rights within the three year time window continued. Many cases properly allowed
borrowers to satisfy§ 1635(f) by notifying the lender of intent to rescind in accordance with the
statute's language and Regulation Z. 167 However, a majority of cases denied relief to borrowers
who notified the lender of rescission within three years, if a lawsuit was not also filed within the
three year period. 168 These courts generally improperly relied upon the Beach decision and
applied it to the Exercising Rights issue, reading in an extra requirement (filing a lawsuit) that is
not present in the statute or regulations. 169 Most recently, the issue of exercising rescission under
TILA has been visited by the Third, Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits.

164
165

See infra Part III.B.
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418 (1998).

166

Jd

167

See e.g., Jozinovich v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. C09-03326, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3358, at *16, (N.D.
CaL Jan. 14, 2010) (rescission permitted because notice of rescission was mailed within three years.); Jackson v.
CIT Group, No. 06-543,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78897, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2006); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg.
Servs., No. 07-5040,2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315, at *26-35 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010); In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 2009); Barnes v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-cv-142, 2011 WL 4950111 (D. Or. Oct. 18,
2011); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2006).
168
See e.g., Geraghty v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, No. 11-336,2011 WL 3920248 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2011);
Bradford v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Va. 2011); DeCosta v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10-0301,
2010 WL 3824224 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2010); Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. v. Carrington, No. 6:09-cv-2132-0r131GJK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17724, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010); Falcocchia v. Saxon Mortg., Inc., 709 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 868 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[P]laintiffs did not file a claim seeking rescission within the three year period .
. . plaintiffs' allegation that they sent a notice of rescission within the three year period is irrelevant."); Ramos v.
Citimortgage, Inc., No. CIV. 08-02250,2009 WL 86744 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009) ("[B]ecause plaintiff filed his
Complaint over three years from the date on which he consummated his loan, the court is without jurisdiction to
consider his claim for rescission under TILA.").
169
See e.g., Carrington, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418
(1998)) ("15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) operates to extinguish the right of rescission itself ... Thus no matter what actions
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1.

The Plain Reading Approach of the Fourth Circuit.

The Fourth Circuit ruled on the proper method of exercising rescission rights to satisfy §
1635(f) in Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC.

170

The Gilbert court did not find the Beach

decision dispositive on the issue. 171 The court conducted a plain reading analysis of§ 1635(f)
and concluded that all a borrower must due to satisfy§ 1635(f) is notify the lender of rescission
within three years.
In Gilbert, the Gilberts were foreclosed upon within three years of refinancing their
mortgage. 172 After the foreclosure was initiated, but before the three year window had
concluded, the borrowers had written to the lender alleging several TILA violations and
notifying the lender of rescission. 173 The lender had responded with a refusal to honor the
rescission. 174 While the Gilberts appealed the foreclosure decision, they filed a separate lawsuit
seeking rescission. 175

This rescission lawsuit was filed outside of the three year window under

§ 1635(f). 176 Though the Gilberts were successful in their appeal of the foreclosure, the separate
rescission action alleging TILA violations was dismissed by a lower court as untimely. 177 The
Gilberts appealed the dismissal of the TILA claims, and the case eventually reached the 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals. 178

[Lender] took or failed to take, [Borrower]'s right to rescind was extinguished ... well before be filed the instant
suit."); see discussion infra Part IV.
170
678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012).
171
!d. at 278 (noting that Beach did not address the issue of how a borrower may exercise the rescission right).
172
Jd at 274.
173 Id

ld
Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 274-275.
176 ld
174
175

177

Jd at 275.

178

ld
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The Gilberts based their appeal on the argument that they exercised the right to rescind
within the three year window by sending the letter to the lender. 179 The court began its analysis
by recognizing that nothing in the statute or Regulation Z says anything about requiring a
borrower to file a lawsuit. 180 The court relied on the plain language of the statute and the
regulation, which both suggest that notification is a proper and sufficient exercise of
rescission. 181 The court also properly distinguished the issue of effecting rescission with
exercising rescission- finding that TILA only requires a borrower to exercise the right of
rescission within three years, not to effect it. 182 In addition, the court also properly distinguished

Beach, finding that the Beach decision simply did not address the method of exercising the right
of rescission. 183 Instead, the court noted that Beach addressed the extinguishment of the right of
rescission after three years, a completely separate issue. 184 The court concluded that notification
of rescission is a proper exercise of rescission rights under TILA and Regulation Z. 185
The court then addressed the Gilberts' claim for damages. According to the court, refusal
to honor rescission is a separate TILA violation and triggers the one year statute of limitations. 186
Because the lawsuit seeking rescission was filed within one year of the Gilberts' letter seeking
rescission, the court held that the Gilberts' could also seek damages for the refusal to honor the
rescission, in addition to being entitled to rescission itself. 187
2.

The Tenth Circuit's Restrictive Approach: Concerned with Clouding the Title of
Mortgages and Reliance on Beach.

179

Id at 276.
Id at 277.
181
Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 277 (4th Cir. N.C. 2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1635(t) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2011).
182
Gilbert, 618 F.3d at 277; see discussion infra Part II.B.2.
183
Id at 278.
t84 Id
185 ld

180

186
187

/d.; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006).
Gilbert, 618 F.3d at 278-279.
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While the Fourth Circuit in Gilbert properly distinguished Beach and found notification
of rescission sufficient to satisfy § 163 5(f), the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. In

Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 188 the Tenth Circuit found Beach dispositive on the issue of how
borrowers may exercise the rescission right, and read an additional implied requirement into the
statute: that a borrower must not only notify the lender of rescission within three years, but must
also file a lawsuit enforcing rescission with three years of the transaction.
Ms. Rosenfield notified the lender that she intended to rescind the transaction about two
years after they refinanced on their home. 189 She claimed that numerous disclosures were not
made, including information on rescission rights, adjustable rates, and finance charges. 190 After
Ms. Rosenfield defaulted, the lender sought to force a sale of the property by filing a motion with
the trial court. 191 Ms. Rosenfield raised rescission as a defense to this proceeding- before the
three year time window under§ 1635(f) had expired. 192 After a foreclosure sale was ordered, the
Rosenfields commenced a separate action seeking, among other claims, a declaratory judgment
deeming the loan rescinded. 193
Ms. Rosenfield argued that she satisfied§ 1635(f)'s time limit when she notified the
lender ofrescission. 194 The court rejected Ms. Rosenfield's argument on two grounds. First, the
court found the Supreme Court decision in Beach to be "dispositive" of the question of
188

681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012).
!d. at 1175-1176.
190
!d. at 1176.
191
Id C.R.C.P. 120 provides an expedited judicial foreclosure proceeding, allowing a secured creditor to file a
verified motion with a trial court to order the sale of the property. It is in this special proceeding that Ms. Rosenfield
raised rescission as a defense.
192
Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1176. This is a key factual distinction with Beach. In Beach, the borrower raised
rescission as a defense after the three year window had expired. See Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at
413 (1998). The Tenth Circuit's reliance on Beach in this different context is demonstrative of the confusion
between the issue of the nature of the three year time limitation - whether it is strict or can be tolled - and the issue
of how to exercise the rescission right for the purpose of§ 1635(t). See Parts lll.A.l, ill.A.2.
193
Rosenfield, 681 F.3d 1172, at 1176 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012).
194
Id at 1182. Ms. Rosenfield also argued that she satisfied the statute by raising rescission as a defense in the
foreclosure proceeding, but that is not the subject of this comment. Nevertheless, the court rejected this argument as
well.
189
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exercising rescission.

195

The court described§ 1635(f)'s three year extension as a strict repose

period that precludes satisfaction by merely notifying the lender of rescission. 196 As support for
this, the court characterized the rescission right as one that can only be redressed "by invoking
the power of the courts." 197 On the other hand, the court noted in dicta that if the lender actually
effectively responds to the rescission notice, then this may satisfy§ 1635(f)'s time limit without
need for judicial intervention. 198 Thus, the court found that Ms. Rosenfield did not satisfy§
1635(f) because she did not file a lawsuit within three years, even though she notified the lender
within the proscribed time period. 199
The court also rejected Ms. Rosenfield's argument on contract principles. 200 The court
first compared TILA's rescission remedy to the common law rescission process. 201 The court
found the TILA rescission process to be analogous to common law rescission, and that the
underlying purpose behind both is "remedial economy." 202 The court reasoned that rescission is
not appropriate, therefore, if enforcement is difficult under the circumstances. 203 The court
concluded that allowing borrowers to exercise rescission by notifying lenders would complicate
enforcement. 204 Specifically, the court was troubled by the prospect of a borrower notifying the

195

Jd

196/d
197

ld at 1183. The Rosenfield court relied on case law concerning statutes of repose ruled upon in other contexts
and upon the common understanding that a statute of repose bars claims - the filing of a lawsuit. Id at 1182-83.
However, the Supreme Court in Beach never used the term "statute of repose" and there are other limitation statutes
that limit the time for an assertion of a right without specifically referring to filing a lawsuit. See discussion infra
Part IV.C.
198
Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183, n. 8 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012). The contrast between the court's position that a court
is necessary for an exercise of rescission by the borrower, and their assertion that a court is not necessary when a
lender acknowledges rescission, is a clear example of the court's improper shifting of bargaining power away from
the borrower and toward the lender. In essence, the court took a statute that was designed to provide borrowers with
enhanced bargaining power, and flipped it around to strengthen the lender's position. Infra Part IV.B.3
199
Rosenfield, 681 F .3d at 1188 ("[N]otice, by itself, is not sufficient to exercise (or preserve) a consumer's right of
rescission under TILA. The commencement of a lawsuit with.in the three-year TILA repose period was required.").
200
!d. at 1184-85.
201
!d. at 1184.
202 ld.
203 Jd
204

!d., 681 F.3d at 1185.
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lender of rescission, but then waiting for some indeterminate time to seek judicial enforcement of
the rescission- the court found that this possibility would "cloud a bank's title on foreclosure." 205
The court then contended with the plain meaning of the statute and the regulations?

06

The court found that the language of § 163 5 and Regulation Z does require borrowers to notify
lenders of rescission, but that this was not sufficient to exercise the right.

207

Instead, with little

analysis, the court found that notifying the lender is merely a predicate act to exercising the right
of rescission, which is accomplished by filing a lawsuit. 208 The court, confusing exercising
rescission rights with effecting rescission, concluded that allowing a borrower to unilaterally
exercise the right to rescind would impermissibly enlarge the time period for rescission and
would cloud the title of property indefinitely. 209
3.

The Third and Ninth Circuits' Reliance on Beach to Require Borrowers to File
Lawsuit.

The Third and Ninth Circuits have also recently ruled on the method of exercising
rescission for the purposes of§ 1635, in Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. 210 and
McOmie-Gray v. Bank ofAmerica Home Loans. 211 Both courts reached the same restrictive
outcome as the Rosenfield court, but produced less detailed opinions. In additio~ both courts
found Beach dispositive in ruling that a borrower must file a lawsuit within three years to satisfy
§ 1635.
In Williams, a disabled and blind homeowner decided to remodel her home? 12 Ms.
Williams received a balloon loan secured by her home that was signed on November 22, 2004? 13

205

Rosenfield, at 1185, 1186 (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, at 418-419 (1998)).
Id at 1185-1187.
207
Id. at I I 85.
206

208

Jd

209

Jd at 1187.

210

410 Fed. Appx. 495 (3d Cir. Pa. 2011).
667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012).
212
Williams, 410 Fed. Appx. at 496.
211
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In April2003, Ms. Williams was $20 short on a mortgage payment and the bank refused to
accept the insufficient amount. 214 The bank obtained a default judgment in a foreclosure action
by September of that year.

215

After initiating a civil action and seeking bankruptcy protection in

an attempt to save her home, Williams notified the lender of her intent to rescind the transaction
based on TILA violations on November 22, 2004? 16 The lender did not respond to this letter.

217

An action to enforce the rescission was not filed until August 22, 2006. 218
The borrowers argued that the three year limitation period is satisfied when rescission is
exercised by notifying the lender. 219 The court, with very little analysis, deferred to the Supreme
Court's holding in Beach?20 The court found that the Supreme Court "implicitly recognized"
that a claim for rescission must be filed with the court within the three-year period, in addition to
notice to the lender. 221 The court then concluded that a legal action enforcing rescission must be
brought within three years. 222
In McOmie-Gray, Ms. McOmie-Gray closed a first deed trust loan in 2006 and was
provided with various disclosure documents to sign. 223 The lender failed to inform her of the
date on which this right to rescind would expire, a key disclosure requirement. 224 Two years
after the loan was consummated, Ms. McOmie-Gray sent a letter to the lender seeking to rescind
the loan, but the bank refused rescission. 225 Instead, according to Ms. McOmie, the bank

213
214

/d.

/d. at 497.
215 Id
216/d
217 ld
218
Williams, 410 Fed. Appx. at 497.
219
/d. at 498.
220 Jd
221
Jd at 499.
222 /d.
223
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 2012).
224
Jd.; See infra Figure 1; 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(l) (2011).
225
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326-1327.
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negotiated with her for over a year regarding the rescission. 226 After these negotiations failed,
Ms. McOmie-Gray filed suit to rescind the loan, but by that point she filed outside of§ 1635(f)'s
three year time period.

227

The McOmie-Gray court's sparse analysis first addressed the legal effect of rescission
under TILA. The court found that notifying the lender merely advances a claim for rescission,
and that rescission is not automatic upon notification. 228 The court then found Beach, as well as
Ninth Circuit precedent establishing § 1635(f) as a statute of repose, dispositive, and rejected
Ms. McOmie's claim?29 Ms. McOmie-Gray had argued that the lender's failure to honor the
rescission notice extended the time period for seeking rescission by another year, but the court
rejected this argument, relying on the Supreme Court's characterization of § 1635(f) as a strict
limitation on the rescission right. 230 The court did not distinguish between deciding upon the
legal effect of rescission on the loan agreement and the effect of exercising rescission for the
purposes of§ 1635(±).231 Instead, the court seemed to hold that because notifying the lender does
not completely effect rescission of the loan agreement, it is also not an exercise of the rescission
right.
IV.

Borrowers Should be Able to Satisfy§ 1635(f)'s Three Year Time Limit on
Rescission by Notifying the Lender of Rescission

Courts should not read additional burdensome requirements for borrowers under TILA.
The recent trend of courts requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy§ 1635(f)' s three year
limit for rescission is a prime example of judicial activism overriding the plan language of a
226

ld at 1327.
ld
228 ld.
229
Jd. at 1329.
230 /d.
231
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327-1329. The McOmie-Gray court did not seem to consider that the notification of
rescission itself is what may satisfy§ 1635(t)'s time restriction. Instead, the court took it as a matter-of-course that
Beach's holding requires borrowers to file lawsuits to exercise rescission, which is an incorrect reading of Beach.
See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.B.2.
227
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statute even when in conflict with the statute's explicitly stated purpose. As the Fourth Circuit
concluded in Gilbert, § 1635(f) only requires borrowers to exercise rescission within three years
of consummating the transaction, and the rescission rights of borrowers who notify the lender of
intent to rescind in accordance with§ 1635(f) and its accompanying regulation within three years
should be protected.
A.

The Fourth Circuit's Reading of§ 1635(f) is Consistent with Congressional Intent and is
Sensible Policy.
§ 1635(f) must be read in the light most favorable to the consumer to be consistent with

Congressional intent. A reading of§ 1635(f) that creates additional onerous requirements is in
direct contrast with the goals of Congress. Moreover, allowing borrowers to satisfy§ 1635(f) via
notification will not in any way cloud the title of mortgages during foreclosure. And finally, a
broad reading of§ 1635(f) that allows borrowers to satisfy the three year window via notification
is sensible public policy.
1.

The Fourth Circuit's Reading of§ 1635(f) is Consistent with Congress's Intent to
use TILA and Regulation Z to Protect Consumers.

A reading of§ 1635(f) that creates additional requirements contrary to the plain language
of the statute is in direct contrast with Congressional intent. Courts generally agree that TILA is
a remedial statute. 232 Its stated purpose is to protect consumers against the uninformed use of
credit offered by unscrupulous creditors. 233 Given TILA's remedial nature, courts have also
agreed that the statute should be interpreted liberally to protect consumers. 234

232

See discussion infra Part ll.A.
15 U.S.C. § 160l(a) (2006); see also Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (lOth Cir. 1974)
(quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The Act .
. . designed to prevent 'unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices' ... is remedial.").
234
See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (lith Cir. 2004) ("As a remedial statute, TILA
must be construed liberally in favor of the consumer."); Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, Nat'l Ass'n, 163 F.3d 948, 950
(6th Cir. 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute and, therefore, should be given a broad,
liberal construction in favor of the consumer."); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910,915 (9th Cir. Cal. 1986) (citation
omitted) ("The courts have construed TILA as a remedial statute, interpreting it liberally for the consumer."); James
233
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In addition to the well-established policy goals ofTILA, developments in the law reflect
Congress' continuing concern with ensuring that borrowers' rescission rights remain strong.
Since TILA's passage in 1968, Congress has had numerous opportunities to amend the rescission
right but has chosen to keep the protection in tact.

235

And even after the 1995 Amendments

sought to make compliance with disclosure requirements easier for lenders, rescission remained
a powerful consumer protection. 236 Congress had another chance to revisit TILA when it passed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter "DoddFrank."i37 Dodd-Frank was passed with the goal, among others, of protecting consumers from
abusive financial services practices. 238 Dodd-Frank's main impact on TILA was to transfer
rulemaking authority away from the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and to the newly-created
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an agency established with the goal of providing
consumers with financial information and preventing unfair business practices. 239
An example of the impact this transfer of power had on the direction of TILA is
evidenced by both agencies' differing approaches to the rules for rescission under TILA. Under
pressure from lenders, the FRB had proposed making rescission more difficult by requiring

v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 729 (5th Cir. Ala. 1980) (citation omitted)(" ... the Truth-in-Lending Act, a
remedial act, has usually been given a broad liberal interpretation since it is assumed that was the intent of
Congress.").
235
See discussion infra ILA.
236
Id; THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("[T]he 1995 amendments provided some additional
leeway to creditors in making certain TIL disclosures."); THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.5 at 9 ("[T]he
retention of the rescission remedy and the relatively low tolerance for defensive claims re-emphasized the particular
important of TILA in providing a remedy for borrowers in foreclosure.").
237
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
238
Id, Preamble (emphasis added) ("An Act To promote the tmancial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the tmancial system, to end "too big to fail", to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive tmancial services practices, and for other purposes.").
239
Id., § llOOA; see 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006) (current statute granting TILA rulemaking authority to the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see also THOMPSON & RENUART, supra note 31, § 1.2.1 1, at 11 ; FALL 2011
STATEMENT OF REGULATORY PRIORITIES, http://www .consumertmance.gov/regulations/fall-20 11-statement-ofregulatory-priorities/ ("the purpose of the CFPB is to implement and enforce Federal consumer fmancial laws
consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer fmancial products
and services and that such markets are fair, transparent, and competitive.").
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borrowers to first tender the amount due - reversing the normal process for TILA rescission. 240
However, before these rules could be implemented, Congress transferred rule making authority
to the CFPB, effective July 2011.

241

The CFPB rejected the FRB's lender-friendly attempt to

change the rules, and instead issued an interim final order affirming the practice that the
consumer must tender only after the creditor has canceled the security interest. 242 Though the
CFPB has proposed rule changes to implement the Dodd-Frank regulations and simplify
disclosure requirements, it has rejected the Board's last-ditch effort to limit rescission rights and
has not once proposed limiting rescission rights. 243 Congress's transfer of authority from the
FRB to the CFPB represents its continuing intent to promote the consumer protections provided
by statutes such as TILA, including the right to rescind. Therefore, TILA must continue to be
interpreted with Congress's goal of protecting the consumer in mind.
2.

Allowing Borrowers to Exercise Rescission via Notification will not Cloud the
Title of Mortgages.

Allowing consumers to satisfy the limitations period by notifying the lender would not
cloud the title of mortgages. The Rosenfield court was especially concerned with this issue, first
expressed by the Supreme Court in Beach. 244 However, while the issue Beach dealt with did
have serious implications for clouding the title of mortgages, that concern is not present in the
context of borrowers exercising the rescission right.

240

75 Fed. Reg. 58539, 58700-58704 (Sept. 24, 2010); see also Dougherty, supra note 18; discussion infra Part
II.B.l.
241

Jd

242

Official Comment to Interim Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 79768, 79996 (Dec. 22, 2011) (Supplement Part I to 1026)
("Once the creditor has fulfilled its obligations under § 1026.23(d)(2), the consumer must tender to the creditor any
r,roperty or money the creditor has already delivered to the consumer.").
43
See e.g., CONSUMER fiNANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU PROPOSES "KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE" MORTGAGE FORMS,
http://www.consumerfmance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-fmancial-protection-bureau-proposes-know-before-youowe-mortgage-forms/; see also Sovem, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2.
244
See discussion infra Part IIJ.C.2.
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If a borrower exercises the rescission right by notifying the creditor, one of two things
will happen. First, the lender may honor the rescission by complying with the procedures
outlined in the statute and Regulation Z.

245

The issue would be resolved without involving the

court. Alternatively, the lender would not honor the rescission. In this scenario, the borrower
would obviously cease payments on the mortgage if he or she believes it is rescinded. Either the
borrower would take affirmative action to seek judicial enforcement of the rescission, or a
foreclosure proceeding would be brought, and the issue would be litigated and resolved before
the judgment and sale would be allowed to proceed.
The only effect of allowing borrowers to exercise rescission this way is that if there are
TILA violations, the borrower would be protected from foreclosure on an illegal loan. If there
are no TILA violations, this would be resolved during litigation as part of the foreclosure
proceeding - an inevitable proceeding after the borrower ceases payments - and the title will be
clear. In the hard-to-imagine scenario where a borrower exercises rescission, but does not cease
payments in an attempt to fool the lender, the borrower will likely be equitably estopped from
asserting rescission as a defense, just as under common law rescission?46 Under any scenario,
then, it is hard to imagine how allowing the borrower to exercise rescission via notification
clouds the title of mortgages. 247

245

See discussion infra Part II. B. 1.
17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 647 ("An election to rescind the contract must be made by the party who has the right to
rescind, and once the election is made, that party must adhere to it"); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver§ 159 ("The
doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a person from maintaining a position or attitude which is inconsistent with
another position or attitude sought to be maintained at the same time or which was asserted at a previous time.").
247
It is important to note that exercising the rescission right is not the same as effecting rescission. See discussion
infra Part II.B.2. While the issue of when the rescission is effected does indeed affect the mortgage- if rescission is
effected unilaterally by notice, then some mortgages will have no force of law without the lender knowing -the
issue of when the rescission right is exercised does not affect the mortgage title.
246
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The Beach court clearly intended to prevent rescission from clouding the title of
mortgages during foreclosure. 248 However, the Beach court accomplished this quite effectively
by precluding tolling of§ 1635(f) and construing it strictly?

49

Indeed, the specific argument that

the Court was addressing when using the "cloud the title" language was whether to allow
rescission claims to be raised at any time as defenses to recoupment action. 250 In other words,
the Court addressed whether an exception can be made to§ 1635(f)'s three year window, and
answered that question negatively on the basis of preventing mortgage titles from being
clouded? 51 By construing§ 1635(f) strictly and preventing tolling, the Supreme Court prevented
rescission issues from clouding the title of mortgages. After Beach, the rescission right may not
be asserted - whether as a filed claim, a notice of rescission, or as a defense to recoupment -

after the three year period. The Court simply did not address the method of exercising rescission
within the three-year period, to which the issue of clouding title of mortgages is inapplicable.

Courts should not read additional statutory requirements in a misguided attempt to
promote Beach's principles, because it involved an entirely separate issue. Clouding the title of
mortgages is simply not an issue for the issue of exercising rescission under§ 1635(f).
3.

It is Sensible Policy to Allow Notification of Rescission to Constitute an Exercise
ofRescission Under§ 1635(£).

It is sensible policy to enforce the plain language of§ 1635(f) because rescission is a

powerful remedy for consumers that should not be subverted by activist courts seeking to read
additional requirements into the statute. A policy that favors rescission is especially important
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Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,418 (1998).
See discussion infra Part lli.B.
250
Beach, 523 U.S. at 418.
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Id; see also Jones v. Saxon Mortg., 537 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. Va. 1998) (emphasis added) ("allowing tolling
under§ 1635(t) and permitting a party to rescind after a foreclosure sale would create uncertainty in any chain of
title of real estate purchased from a foreclosure sale. Real estate purchased from a foreclosure sale would be less
marketable if purchasers could somehow later be divested of title. Similarly, title to real estate purchased from a
foreclosure sale would be clouded.").
249

36

after the recent surge in foreclosures, possibly caused in part by the lack of effectiveness of
disclosure requirements, has placed the homes of many borrowers at risk. Allowing consumers
to satisfy§ 1635(f) via notification would enable the rescission statute and regulation to proceed
more efficiently and effectively.
The powerful remedy of rescission is even more essential after the recent explosion in
foreclosure litigation. The housing bubble that preceded the foreclosure crisis was precipitated
by many borrowers accepting loans that they could not hope to repay, and some argue that a
primary cause of this was the inadequacy of TILA' s disclosure requirements. 252 While the
inadequacies of the disclosure requirements have been questioned, 253 those consumers who have
not received even the disclosures required by law are often left with rescission as the sole way to
keep their home and obtain a loan they can actually repay. Indeed, as foreclosure filings
increased during the economic crisis, rescission became an increasingly powerful tool for
consumers. 254 Thus, as the number of foreclosure filings increased, so have the number of
rescission cases. 255 One observer has even referred to rescission as "the biggest hammer in the
toolkit for a lawyer helping someone to save their home. " 256 As a result of these considerations,
it is in the public's interest to ensure that consumers who have been misled as a result of the
practices of the mortgage industry have recourse to rescind these faulty transactions. It is not
appropriate to read extra requirements into§ 1635 that would preclude borrowers from receiving
this protection. Any public policy to the contrary should come from Congress, not the courts,
due to the prevalence and complicated nature of the problem.
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Sovern, Help for the Perplexed Home Buyer supra note 2.; Sovem, supra note 14.
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Jd
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 19 (describing rescission as "the most effective legal tool that borrowers have
to fight foreclosures.").
255
Dougherty, supra note 18 (citing an estimate from Kathleen Day, spokeswoman for the Center for Responsible
Lending, estimating "thousands" of rescission cases pending due to the economic crisis).
256
Jd (quoting Ira Rheingold, executive director, National Association of Consumer Advocates).
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Moreover, the statutory scheme articulated by TILA and Regulation Z works most
efficiently when consumers can satisfy the limitations period by notifying the lender of
rescission. Requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy the limitations period is burdensome
to the very consumers that Congress intended to protect. Under the statutory scheme, lenders are
given twenty days to void the security transaction, after which point the borrower must tender
payment.257 Reading§ 1635(t) to require borrowers to file a lawsuit complicates this process
further. Filing a lawsuit is often costly, and borrowers who have been saddled with loans that
they cannot repay should not be required to outlay money to initiate the lawsuit. TILA
recognizes the precarious position these borrowers are in, which is why it only requires tender of
payment after the lender voids the security interest - a clear reversal of the traditional common
law rescission process. 258 Requiring borrowers to initiate litigation to satisfy the limitations
period would upset this delicate balance. Indeed, neither the statute nor the regulation requires a
court to oversee the rescission process. The statutory scheme has been described as an
enhancement of common law rescission. 259 The purpose of§ 1635 is to allow rescission without
judicial intervention, and requiring borrowers to file a lawsuit to satisfy the limitation period
would completely upend this process?60 A rule that encourages borrower's to file suit as soon as
notifying the lender flies in the face of this non-judicial purpose of§ 1635.
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15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (2011).
Shepard, supra note 98; infra IV.B.3. Some courts have required a borrower to make a showing that she will be
able to tender payment, before they will recognize rescission. See generally Shepard, supra note 98. However,
courts are not always involved in rescission and not all courts require a showing of tender. See discussion infra
II.B.l. In any case, the borrower does not have to actuaJiy tender any amount until after the security interest has
been voided. Moreover, in many cases the borrower will negotiate a new loan with a new lender who will provide
the tender to the original lender. See Dougherty, supra note 18.
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Shepard, supra note 98, at 188.
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See e.g., Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17,25 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[S]ection 1635 is written with
the goal of making the rescission process a private one, worked out between creditor and debtor without the
intervention of the courts.").
258

38

Moreover, banks could, if they violated TILA, simply not respond to the borrower's letter
or stonewall until the three-year period expires and then foreclose. The facts alleged in the

Mc0mie-Gray261 case are a perfect example of this?62 The bank in that case responded to the
notice of rescission by negotiating with Ms. McOmie until the limitations period expired. 263 Ms.
McOmie was therefore precluded from a remedy for any disclosure violations. 264 A rule that
encourages lenders to ignore letters of rescission or to stonewall until the limitations period has
expired is unacceptable given TILA' s broad objective of protecting consumers from deceptive
lenders. 265
In addition, providing two separate methods of exercising the rescission right - the
treatment of each depending on whether the right is exercised within the first three days or within
the extended three year window- is likely to confuse consumers. 266 The current rule requires
the notice of intent to rescind to include how to exercise the right to rescind, and for the lender to
include a form of rescission with the lender's address on it. 267 The model form provided by the
regulations clearly indicates that rescission is exercised by simply sending the form to the lender
within three days. 268 Consumers are given clear instructions to exercise rescission by notifying
the creditor - courts should not read additional requirements that do not appear in the statute,
regulations, or notice forms. This will just confuse consumers who are never informed of the
need to file a lawsuit within three years.
B.

The Plain Language of the Statute and Regulation Support Exercise via Notification
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McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012).
See McOmie-Gray summary infra lli.C.3.
263
McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326.
264 !d.
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See discussion infra Part IV .A.l.
266
A proposed rule by the Federal Reserve Board noted that "[c]onsumers were confused when presented with a
single disclosure that provided information about the three-business-day right to rescind and an extended right to
rescind ..." 75 Fed. Reg. 58539 (Sept. 24, 2010).
267
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(bXI )(iii) (20 11 ).
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See Figure 1.
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The Fourth Circuit's plain language reading of§ 1635(f) is appropriate because the
language is unambiguous. Moreover, the right of rescission for disclosure violations did not
exist at common law and therefore should be governed strictly by the statute. After applying a
plain language analysis relying solely on the words of the statute and accompanying regulation,
it is clear that § 1635(f) only requires borrowers to exercise the rescission right via notification
within three years. This interpretation is also completely consistent with the Supreme Court's
holding ultimate holding in Beach, as well as principles of common law rescission.
1.

A Plain Language Reading Supports Exercise of Rescission via Notification.

A plain language reading of§ 1635 supports the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that
notification of rescission is sufficient to satisfy§ 1635(f). The right of action created by§ 1635
and § 1640 did not exist at common law. 269 Though rescission rights generally do exist at
common law/ 70 the right to rescind in response to TILA disclosure violations is statutorily. .
created. 271 Because TILA created the right of rescission, any limitations on the right should be
discerned from the statute itsel£ 272 Before limiting a statutory right, therefore, courts should rely
upon the contours of that right as defined by the statute. Moreover, it is an axiom of statutory
interpretation that courts initially "presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
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Beach v. Great W. Bank, 670 So. 2d 986, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1996) ("The right of rescission of a
security interest for material violations of TILA disclosures is not a right existing under the common law. It is
clearly and only the creation of statute."); James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727,729 (5th Cir. Ala. 1980) ("§
1635 is a statutorily created right.").
270
See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
271
See Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan & Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (I Oth Cir. 1974) (quoting N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("The Act ... designed to prevent
'unscrupulous and predatory creditor practices' ... is remedial"); Begala v. PNC Bank, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950
(6th Cir. Ohio 1998) ("We have repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute."); Smith v. No.2 Galesburg
Crown Finance Corp., 615 F.2d 407,415 (7th Cir. Ill. 1980) (finding that TILA action survives as remedial claim,
and recognizing that "courts have tended to emphasize the remedial character of the statute.").
272
Great W Bank, 610 So. 2d at 992 ("While the legislature may be without power to abolish common law rights,
the legislature may create other rights and impose on them such limitations as it deems advisable. When it does,
those limitations form part of the assertion of the right itself.").
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means in a statute what it says there. " 273 Thus, the starting point of any statutory analysis is the
language of the statute itself. 274 To aid in understanding statutory language, the statute must be

read in context with all of its various provisions. 275 In addition, the Supreme Court has noted
that courts should resist reading words into a statute that appears plain on its face. 276 And
finally, the Supreme Court has stated that when a statute prescribes action by a particular mode,
. prec1udes action
. by aItemattve
. mo des not menttone
. d tnt
. he statute. 277
tt
Applying these principles to the language of§ 1635 reveals that the statute simply states
that the right of rescission is exercised via notification of intent to rescind to the lender. Though
§ 1635(f) itself is silent as to the proper method of exercising rescission, read in context it is
clearly an extension of the same right guaranteed by the buyer's remorse provision. In reference
to the three-day buyer's remorse rescission,§ 1635(a) states that a borrower may rescind the
transaction by notifying the lender of his intent to do so in accordance with regulations. 278 §
1635(f) simply states that the right of rescission expires after three years. 279 Read together, these
two provisions state that the right to rescind by notification in accordance with regulations
expires after three years of the date of the transaction.
Because§ 1635 is an extension of the same right provided for by the buyer's remorse
provision, there is no reason to suggest that the statute contains an additional burden for
borrowers asserting the right under§ 1635(f) as opposed to the buyer's remorse provision.
273

Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 (1992).
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (quoting Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.").
275
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rei. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409,415 (2005) ("Statutory
language has meaning only in context.").
276
Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, at 29 (1997))
(courts should "ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.").
277
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000) (quoting Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 269, 270 (1872)) ("[W]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of
any other mode.").
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15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2006).
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15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006).
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Nothing in the language of the statutes differentiates between exercising rescission under the
buyer's remorse provision or§ 1635(f)?80 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that

§ 1635 says nothing in terms of filing a lawsuit.

281

The Supreme Court ruled that§ 1635(f)

contains no lawsuit requirement and instead governs the life of the underlying rescission right282
- the same exact right provided in the buyer's remorse provision, which is clearly exercised via
notification? 83 Therefore, it is a simple and logical inference that rescission is also exercised via
notification for the purposes of§ 1635(f). Since notice of rescission is clearly sufficient to
exercise rescission within three days, it is also sufficient to exercise rescission within three years
under the terms of the statute? 84
Because the language is clear, courts should resist reading additional requirements, such
as a filing requirement, into the statute. Courts should especially resist adding requirements
when they are burdensome hurdles for the very same borrowers that TILA, a remedial statute, is
intended to protect? 85 Under the clear language of§ 1635(f), a borrower must notify the lender
of rescission within three years to exercise rescission. If the borrower fails to do this, the right of
rescission expires after the three year period runs.
1.

Sub-Issue: How Long do Borrowers have to Seek Judicial of
Unacknowledged Rescissions?

TILA' s language is not as clear on the issue of the time limitation for borrowers to seek
judicial enforcement of rescission when rescission is proper but the lender fails to honor it. In

Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., No. 07~5040, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315, at *32 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2010)
("(N]either the statute nor the regulation requires the filing of suit within the time period, and neither differentiates
between the notice required to invoke rescission within the three-day or the three-year period.").
281
Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,417 (1998).
280

282Jd
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15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).
Sherzer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137315 at *32.
285
infra note 37.
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other words, if a borrower properly exercises the right to rescind by notifying the creditor, how
long does she have under TILA to seek judicial enforcement if the lender fails to respond?
Many courts applying the plain language analysis of§ 1635 have imposed the one-year
statute of limitations under § 1640(e) to this type of situation.

286

Under this view, borrowers

have one year after notifying of rescission to seek enforcement and damages from the lender's
failure to honor rescission. However, while the one-year limit to seek a damage award for failure
to honor rescission is clearly appropriate under the statute, it is unclear whether this can or
should be used as a limit on seeking judicial enforcement of rescission? 87 The courts have
essentially read this one-year limitation on judicial enforcement into the statute. Perhaps the
difficulty of resolving this issue is what has inspired some courts to make notification an
insufficient exercise of rescission, in spite of the statutory language to the contrary. 288
Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine the case where a borrower exercises rescission but does
not seek to enforce it, either by refusing to make payments on the loan and forcing foreclosure or
modification, or by seeking judicial enforcement. 289 In the rare instance where a borrower
induces a lender to keep accepting payments after having purported to rescind the loan, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel and axioms of common law contracts may be more appropriate to
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See In re Hunter, 400 B.R. 651, 660-61 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009); Santos v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-912,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71736, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271
(4th Cir. N.C. 2012). Many courts have found a lender's failure to honor rescission creates a private cause of action
for money damages. Because this action would be for money damages,§ 1640(e)'s one year limitation would
clearly apply and begin to run at the date of the lender's failure to honor.
287
The appropriateness of utilizing § 1640(e) to limit rescission actions is questionable because that provision is
focused on actions seeking money damages and clearly does not encompass enforcement of equitable remedies such
as rescission. The issue of seeking money damages for failure to honor rescission, on the other hand, is clearly
contemplated by§ 1640(e). Infra note 286.
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See discussion infra Part IV .B.l
289
See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. Moreover, no court disputes that exercising rescission in the initial three-day
buyer's remorse period is satisfied via notification. The issue of the time limit on seeking judicial enforcement is as
present in that situation as under the three year statute of repose - even if it does not arise nearly as often. Since it is
not a problem under § 1635(a), it should not be a problem under§ 1635(f).
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protect the lender than TILA's one-year damages limitation.

° For instance, under common law

29

rescission, once a party rescinds a contract she is bound to adhere to the rescission?91 And the
doctrine of equitable estoppel would protect the lender if a borrower seeks to enforce rescission
after acting inconsistently with rescission. 292 Either of these doctrines would prevent bad faith
borrowers from asserting rescission as a failsafe plan against some contemplated future default.
These doctrines would also protect good faith lenders who fail to void the security interest, after
relying upon a borrower's actions as opposed to her words.
2.

The Plain Language Reading is Consistent with Beach.

As noted above, the plain language of § 163 5 indicates that notice of rescission is a
proper exercise of the rescission right for the purposes of§ 1635(±)?93 Though some courts have
found that the Supreme Court's decision in Beach mandates the opposite conclusion, 294 this
reading is completely consistent with Beach.
In Beach, the Court held that§ 1635(±) is a strict repose period for the rescission right. 295
As part of its holding, the Court stated that TILA "permits no federal right to rescind, defensively
or otherwise, after the 3-year period of§ 1635(±) has run." 296 However, the court made no effort
to explain what actually constitutes an exercise of the right to rescind.
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Indeed, the Beach

15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2006).
17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 647 ("An election to rescind the contract must be made by the party who has the right to
rescind, and once the election is made, that party must adhere to it."); Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55,62 (1876)
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31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver§ 159 ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a person from maintaining a
position or attitude which is inconsistent with another position or attitude sought to be maintained at the same time
or which was asserted at a previous time.").
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See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
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decision was expressly concerned with rescission being asserted outside the three year time
period contained in§ 1635(f); the Court did not explain how to properly assert the rescission
right within the allowed three year period. 298 Therefore, Beach stands simply for the proposition
that§ 1635(f) governs the life of the underlying rescission right, which expires after three years.
But the Court did not explain the proper method of exercising rescission within three years whether it is accomplished by notice or lawsuit. Tellingly, the Court noted that§ 1635(f) does
not mention filing a lawsuit. 299 The issue of properly exercising rescission within the three-year
period had already arisen by the time Beach was decided, 300 and if the Court had intended to
address the issue it would have done so clearly.
Even the underlying policy rationale of the Beach decision is consistent with borrowers
exercising the rescission right for the purposes of§ 1635(f) via notification. In Beach, the Court
was concerned with whether rescission claims could be raised as defenses to recoupment actions
outside of 1635(f)'s three year window. 301 The Court worried that allowing rescission claims to
be raised perpetually as defenses in recoupment actions pursuant to § 1640(e) would "cloud the
title" of mortgages during foreclosure. 302 However, this policy concern is simply not present in
the context of deciding whether notice is a sufficient exercise of the rescission right for the
purposes of§ 1635(f). 303 Allowing borrowers who properly notify the lender of rescission within
three years to be entitled to rescission has no effect on Beach's policy of preventing the clouding
of mortgages, because the question of whether the loan was rescinded will be resolved within a
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Beach, 523 U.S. at 417 ("Subsection 1635(f) . . . says nothing in terms of bringing an action ... It talks not of a
suit's commencement but of a right's duration.").
300
See discussion infra Part TII.A.l .
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See discussion infra Part ill.B.
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Beach, 523 U.S. at418.
303
See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
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reasonable time or during the foreclosure proceeding itself. 304 Therefore, the view that notice of
rescission satisfies§ 1635(f) is completely consistent with both the holding of Beach and its
underlying rationale. Courts should not read additional requirements into the statute based on a
misguided attempt to promote Beach's principles. 305
3.

Principles of Common Law Rescission Also Support the Plain Reading of §
1635(f).

It is a principal of statutory construction that statutes should be construed with reference

to common law principals, and that statutes should not be read to incorporate changes to the
common Jaw unless clearly prescribed. 306 On the other hand, principles of the common law
cannot be used to override the intentions of Congress? 07
Rescission as a contract remedy has existed at the common law for many years. 308 At the
common law, rescission was exercised when the aggrieved party that has the right to rescind
expresses it. 309 Thus, courts have held that rescission is a "fact" that is "complete" whether the
aggrieved party makes the fact known to the other party, either by lawsuit or by unequivocal
notice. 310 Under the common law, the other party has the opportunity to accept the rescission,
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Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,399-400,5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) ("[G]eneral expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the
case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision.").
306
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 473 ("In case of ambiguity, statutes are to be construed with reference to the principles of the
common law in force at the time of their passage, and statutes are not to be interpreted as effecting any change in the
common law beyond that which is clearly indicated."); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392
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Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304 (1959) (quoting Shaw v. Merchants' Nat. Bank,
101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) ("(n)o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words
import.").
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Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012) ("Congress plainly can override those [common
law] principles.").
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See e.g., Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55 (1876).
309
17B C.J .S. Contracts § 648 ("A clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal notice of rescission from the aggrieved
~arty to the other party to the contract generalJy is necessary to effect a rescission of the contract.").
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E.g., Cunningham v. Pettigrew, 169 F. 335, 341 (8th Cir. 1909) ("Rescission is a fact, the assertion by one party
to avoidable contract of his right (if such he had) to avoid it, and when the fact is made known to the other party,
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and the issue is resolved without the involvement of courts. 311 However, if the other party rejects
rescission, the borrower may file a lawsuit to enforce the rescission, but cannot seek damages

under the contract. 312 If notice of rescission was given and is considered valid, the judicial
proceeding is an equitable proceeding to determine whether to confirm or deny the rescission in other words, to confrrm or deny the earlier exercise of the rescission right, to establish whether
the aggrieved party had the right in the first place, and to restore the parties through restitution. 313
Traditionally, under the common law a showing of tender by the borrower was necessary before
a court would grant the equitable remedy ofrescission. 314 The purpose of this common law
process is to restore the parties to the status quo ante, as if the contract was never signed in the
first place. 315
TILA' s rescission remedy has been viewed as enhancing the protections that the common
law rescission remedy provides to consumers. 316 The procedures outlined by the statute seem to

whether by a suit or in any other unequivocal way, the rescission is complete."); Griggs v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 385 F.3d 440, 445-56 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[R]escission itself is effected when the plaintiff gives notice to the
defendant that the transaction has been avoided and tenders to the defendant the benefits received by the plaintiff
under the contract.").
311
C. Brown Trucking Co. Inc. v. Henderson, 305 Ga. App. 873, 874 (2010) (citation omitted) ("Parties may by
mutual consent abandon an existing contract between them so as to make it not thereafter binding and the contract
may be rescinded by conduct as well as by words.").
312
Hooker v. Norbu, 899 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ("[R]escission of such contract terminates it with
restitution."); 17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 656 ("The rescission of a contract precludes the recovery of damages for
breach of contract, since rescission and damages for breach of contract are inconsistent remedies and the decision to
pursue one remedy bars the other remedy.").
313
See e.g., Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) ("When a party gives notice of
rescission, it has effected the rescission, and any subsequent judicial proceedings are for the purpose of confrrming
and enforcing that rescission.").
314
Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Under common law rescission, the
rescinding party must first tender the property that he has received under the agreement before the contract may be
considered void.").
315
Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 62 (1876) ("A court of equity is always reluctant to rescind, unless the parties can
be put back in statu quo. If this cannot be done, it will give such relief only where the clearest and strongest equity
imperatively demands it."); Am. Serv.lns. Co. v. ·u nited Auto. Ins. Co., 409111. App. 3d 27,35 (2011) ("Rescission
is the cancellation of a contract thereby restoring the parties to their initial status.").
316
Shepard, supra note 98, at 188 (20 I 0) ("TILA's rescission provisions shift significant leverage to consumers by
enhancing the protections provided to consumers under common law causes of action and remedies, the oldest and
most basic forms of consumer protection.").
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acknowledge the common law framework for rescission, 317 but add a few key differences to
protect consumers. For instance, whereas grounds for rescission under the common law for
fraud must have been pled with particularity to be confirmed, TILA liberalizes the requirements
by establishing disclosure violations as strict liability for the purposes of rescission. 318
Additionally, TILA provides borrowers with up to three years to rescind the contract, 319 whereas
under the common law rescission must be brought within a reasonable time. 320 And
significantly, TILA reverses the tender requirement, requiring the lender to void the security
interest before the borrower is required to tender payment. 321 By reversing the tender
requirement, TILA provides consumers with extra leverage and more time to obtain financing to
tender. 322
Despite the few changes to the rescission process made by TILA, the plain reading
interpretation of§ 1635(£) is consistent with the basic principles of common law rescission.
Under this view, rescission may be resolved without involvement of the courts,323 but the court is
petitioned to either confirm or deny the validity of the rescission and to govern the restitution
process. 324 Similarly, the common law grants the right to rescind to certain parties in certain
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17B C.J.S. Contracts§ 641 ("The right to rescind a contract must be exercised promptly or within a reasonable
time on discovery of facts from which the right arises, but what constitutes a reasonable time depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.").
321
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Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 n.8 (lOth Cir. Colo. 2012) (recognizing in dicta that if the
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"complete" and enforceable by a court in equity.).
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circumstances, and the right may be exercised by a unilateral expression of intent to rescind. 325
The right must be invoked within a reasonable time upon discovery of the cause for rescission, 326
and a court may later grant an equitable remedy of rescission if the party seeking to rescind was
justified. 327 § 1635(f) changes this common law process by mandating the time limit for the
rescission right to be invoked: instead of being limited by "reasonableness," the period to
exercise rescission is expanded to three years. In most other respects, this reading of§ 1635(f) is
consistent with the underlying process involved at common law rescission.
The Rosenfield court sought to justify its restrictive holding that§ 1635(f) requires the
filing of a lawsuit on common law grounds. 328 While the court accurately described TILA
rescission as analogous to common law rescission, 329 the court nonetheless found that a key
policy behind common law rescission- "remedial economy" -justified its restrictive view of§
1635(f). 330 The court found that the difficulties in enforcing the Fourth Circuit's view of§
1635(f) would jeopardize remedial economy by clouding the title of mortgages with the potential
for rescission indefinitely. 331 However, the Rosenfield court's argument is based upon the
erroneous assumption that permitting rescission to be exercised via notification would cloud the
title of mortgages. Because invoking rescission via notification does not burden mortgage
325

17B C.J .S. Contracts § 646 ("As a general rule, to effect a rescission of a contract, an affmnative act on the part
of the person desiring to rescind is necessary, and a contract may be rescinded by the parties by their conduct as well
as by words.").
326
17B C.J .S. Contracts § 641 ("The right to rescind a contract must be exercised promptly or within a reasonable
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circumstances of the particular case.").
327
Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) ("When a party gives notice of rescission,
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328
Rosenfield, 681 F .3d at 1184-1185.
329
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330
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331
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titles, 332 the Rosenfield court's argument is undercut. Instead, the Fourth Circuit's reading of§
1635(f) is indeed consistent with common law rescission.
C.

To the Extent that§ 1635(f) is Silent or Ambiguous, Courts Should Defer to Regulation
Z's interpretation.
If any silence or ambiguity is to be found in the statute itself, courts should give

deference to the accompanying regulation. TILA provides the CFPB with the authority to
promulgate regulations implementing TILA and to determine what constitutes notification of
rescission. 333 Regulation Z clearly states that for a consumer to exercise the right to rescind, the
consumer must "notify the creditor of rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written
communication. " 334 The regulation then states that the right of rescission expires after three
years if certain disclosures are not made. 335 Read together, these regulations state that the right
to rescind "by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication" expires after three years
if certain disclosures are not made. Nothing in the language of either the statute or the regulation
requires the filing of a lawsuit to assert rescission. Moreover, the regulation does not
differentiate between exercising rescission under§ 1635(f) and under the buyer's remorse
provision. Indeed, the regulations governing the method of exercising rescission, providing
buyer's remorse rescission, and extending the right to three years are all under the general
"Consumer's Right to Rescind" heading. 336 The CFPB's proposed rescission rule maintains this
organization of the regulation,337 and the CFPB itself has taken the position in litigation that §
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1635(f) only requires rescission via notification. 338 Thus, Regulation Z's interpretation of§
163 5(f) is that a borrower's notification of rescission satisfies the three year time extension.
Whereas§ 1635(f) may be considered vague or at least imprecise on the issue, Regulation Z
suggests that exercising rescission is the same under either the buyer's remorse provision or§
1635(f). This raises the question of whether this interpretation is entitled to deference by the
courts.
The hallmark case concerning judicial deference to executive agencies remains Chevron

USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 339 With respect to Regulation Z in

°

particular, the Supreme Court has often favored the deferential Chevron approach. 34 Chevron
established a two-part test to determine whether a regulation is binding on the courts. First,
courts ask whether Congress has directly spoken on the interpretation problem at issue. 341 If the
statutory language or Congressional intent is clear, courts - and the regulatory agency- must
give effect to the intent of Congress. 342 Next, courts ask whether the regulation is "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. " 343 If the regulation is reasonable, it is given
controlling weight. 344 When an agency has expressed its opinion in an informal manner that

338

Brief for Amicus CFPB, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank ,USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (lOth Circ. Colo. 2010) (No. 10-1442),
available at http://files.consumerfmance.gov/f/20 1203_ cfpb_Rosenfield_vs_ HSBC_Amicus. pdf; Brief for Amicus
CFPB, Sobieniak v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. (2012) (No. 12-1053), available at
http://files.consumerfmance.gov/f/20 1204_ CFPB_ Sobieniak-amicus-brief.pdf.
339
467 u.s. 837 (1984).
340
See e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) ("(C]aution must temper judicial
creativity in the face of legislative or regulatory silence ... deference is especially appropriate in the process of
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z."); Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219
(1981) ("(A]bsent some obvious repugnance to the statute, the ... regulation implementing [TILA] should be
accepted by the courts.''); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004); Household Credit Servs. v.
Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232,238-239 {2004).
341
Jd. at 842.
342
Id. at 842-843.
343
/d. at 843-844.
344

/d.

51

lacks the force of law, such as an opinion letter, the agency's opinion is not entitled to Chevron
deference but is still entitled to respect as an aid to statutory interpretation. 345
With respect to the first prong of Chevron, § 163 5(f) may be said to be ambiguous
because, unlike the buyer's remorse provision,§ 1635(f) does not specify the proper method of
rescission. Though the context of the statute suggests Congressional intent to have rescission
exercised the same way under either provision,346 it is possible that the inartfullack of precision
in the language of§ 1635(f) may be interpreted as a gap in the statute. Similarly, though the
Congressional intent behind TILA!> and particularly its recent transfer of rulemaking authority to
the CFPB, suggests that Congress is interested in easing requirements for borrowers/ 47 this can
hardly be considered a clear statement on this specific issue by Congress.
These considerations allow the analysis to proceed to the second part of Chevron:
whether the regulation is a reasonable construction of the statute. Regulation Z' s interpretation
of§ 1635(f) is not arbitrary or capricious and therefore should be given deference. First, the
regulation's interpretation of§ 1635(f) is consistent with similar statutes of repose in many other
contexts. Look for "bar date" deadline to file claims in bankruptcy For instance, the Universal
Commercial Code as enacted in New York contains a one-year statute of repose that requires
bank customers to object within one year of receiving notice of an unauthorized wire transfer. 348
If objection is not made, the right to be reimbursed by the bank extinguishes. 349 This is an
example of a statute of repose that is satisfied not by filing a lawsuit, but by engaging in some
other sort of action to preserve a right granted by statute. Since these types of statutes - granting
345

Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (internal quotation omitted) ("Interpretations such as
those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference . . . Instead, interpretations
contained in formats such as opinion letters are entitled to respect.).
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a right, but allowing it to be preserved by an action other than filing a lawsuit within a set time
period- exist in other contexts, Regulation Z's interpretation of§ 1635(f) to be this type of
statute is hardly arbitrary.
In addition, Regulation Z' s lack of arbitrariness is evident from considerations of
Congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and principles of common law. As noted above,
a borrower-friendly reading of§ 1635(f) is consistent both with the underlying goals ofTILA
and the recent actions by Congress seeking to expand consumer protection laws. 350 The
Regulation Z interpretation is also consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning and policy
rationale outline in Beach, 351 and with the process of common law rescission. 352 Finally,
Regulation Z' s interpretation is in accordance with the principal that remedial statutes should be
construed liberally to protect the people the statute sought to help. 353 Thus, Regulation Z's
interpretation can not be considered arbitrary or capricious.
None of the Courts of Appeals ruling on this issue even passed on the issue of providing
deference to the regulation. 354 However, to the extent that§ 1635(f) is silent concerning the
proper method of exercising rescission, Regulation Z should be given deference as an
administrative gap-filler.
V.

Proposed Solutions

Though the statutory and regulatory language appear to state that exercise of rescission is
accomplished via notification to the lender, either Congress or the Supreme Court may act to
resolve the split among the circuits. A gross misinterpretation of a Supreme Court case, as well
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as an inartfully drawn statute, has placed into jeopardy the rescission rights of many borrowers.
The following two fixes should repair the situation.

A.

The Supreme Court Can Resolve the Split Created by Beach.
The split between the circuits concerning the exercise of rescission rights has largely

been the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Beach and the subsequent surge in foreclosure
filings that occurred during the fmancial crisis of the 2000s. 355 The Fourth Circuit has read §
1635(f) to only require notice of rescission, but the Third, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have reached
the opposite conclusion largely by relying on the Beach decision. 356

The issue is currently

pending before the Eighth Circuit,357 and district and bankruptcy courts throughout the country
have disagreed on this issue.
As a result of this confusion, the Supreme Court should revisit§ 1635(f). The Court
should clarify that Beach only stood for the proposition that§ 1635(f) is a strict three year time
limitation on rescission claims, and that the Court did not rule on the proper method of
exercising the right to rescind within the three year period. Instead, the Court should confirm
that the plain meaning of the statute and accompanying regulations detail the exercise of the
rescission right. The Court should clarify that, as under buyer's remorse rescission, a borrower
can exercise the right to rescind under§ 1635(f) by notifying the lender of rescission. If the
lender is properly and timely notified, the rescission right has been exercised and a court may
confirm or deny the rescission in a subsequent proceeding. 358
B.

A Legislative Amendment To Clarify§ 1635

ld
ld
357
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358
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As discussed, under the terms of the statute there is little reason to conclude that

exercising the three-day rescission right is any different from exercising the three-year extended
rescission right. 359 Regulation Z, by incorporating both modes of exercising rescission into the
same regulatory heading, agrees with this interpretation. 360 Nonetheless, a legislative
amendment can make the statute even more clear. Such an amendment must clearly indicate that
the mode of exercising the rescission right is the same under either buyer's remorse rescission or
§ 1635(f). A simple amendment to§ 1635(f) would accomplish this. An example of proposed
legislation is provided in Figure 2, with the proposed amended language underlined. 361

Figure 2 - Sample Proposed Legislation to Clarify the Exercise of Rescission Rights under §
1635(f).
§ 163 5. Right of rescission as to certain transactions
(f) Time limit for exercise of right. An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three
years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the
property, whichever occurs first, unless the right of rescission is exercised by
notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention
to rescind,
VI.

Conclusion

The Truth In Lending Act's right of rescission is an important remedy for many
borrowers, particularly those borrowers who have accepted loans with no hope of repayment.
The rescission right is a strict liability right to rescind certain loans, and the right extends to up to
three years after the date of the transaction pursuant to§ 1635(f) ofTILA. Since the collapse of
the housing industry, and subsequent drop in the value of homes, many borrowers are in no
position to hire a lawyer and initiate costly litigation just to have the right of rescission survive
the statutorily-prescribed period. Moreover, many of these borrowers have made good-faith
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attempts to comply with the law, by relying on indications on the notice of rescission form that
rescission is accomplished via notification, but have had their rescission claims rejected by
courts as untimely. Other borrowers have encountered lenders that, after receiving notice of
rescission, cynically stonewall with hopeless negotiations until the repose period for rescission
expires, after which point they file a foreclosure complaint.
The Truth In Lending Act must be read to allow rescission claims to survive if notice of
rescission has been provided to the lender within three years of the consummation of the loan. A
contrary reading of the statute punishes good faith borrowers who discover disclosure violations
late- presumably, after encountering trouble keeping up with payments. These borrowers are
often in fmancial distress and lack legal sophistication. Moreover, requiring these borrowers to
file a lawsuit rewards the cynical lenders who choose to either ignore notices of intent to rescind
or, as in the case of Ms. McOmie-Gray, goad the borrower with negotiation only to foreclosure
after the three year period expires.
The Supreme Court itself has noted that neither the statute nor regulations discuss any
requirement that borrowers must file a lawsuit in order for their rescission claims to survive the
repose period. Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit and many lower courts concluded, the plain
language of TILA simply requires borrowers to notify the lender of intention to rescind within
three years. Other circuits have read an additional requirement into the law, requiring borrowers
to notify lenders of rescission and to file a lawsuit seeking rescission within three years. These
courts have largely relied on and misinterpreted Supreme Court doctrine. A correction of these
misinterpretations is necessary to protect good faith borrowers and prevent lenders from escaping
liability for TILA violations by stonewalling borrowers.
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As noted, the plain language of TILA and the regulations support the Fourth Circuit view
that notice is a sufficient exercise of rescission. This interpretation is completely consistent with
the holdings of Supreme Court precedent, as well as the underlying policy rationales behind that
precedent. This interpretation is also consistent with the principles underlying common law
rescission, and the recent public policies pursued by a Congress interested in protecting
borrowers from unfair credit practices. Finally, given TILA's nature as a remedial statute, and
the courts' admonishment that it must be interpreted it in the light most favorable to borrowers,
the plain language of the statute should be relied upon by courts interpreting§ 1635(f).
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